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ARTICLE
WHEN ACADEMIC FREEDOM COLLIDES
WITH RELIGIOUS LIBERTY OF
RELIGIOUS UNIVERSITIES
TANNER BEAN* & ROBIN FRETWELL WILSON**
I. INTRODUCTION
One in five U.S. colleges and universities has ties to a religious organi-
zation.1 Religiously affiliated institutions of higher education are diverse,
varying in mission, character, religious affiliation, and the role that research
and scholarship play in the preparation of students to lead impactful lives.2
The most explicitly religious of these institutions, theological seminaries,
train students for careers within the faith, as ministers, priests, and imams.
Other institutions are outwardly indistinguishable from their secular coun-
terparts, even if loosely affiliated with religious orders at their founding or
today. Yet others strive to admit students with largely the same faith com-
mitments, who are educated not only in the faith but in all manner of disci-
* Staff Attorney to the Honorable Molly J. Huskey of the Idaho Court of Appeals, Re-
search Assistant to Professor Robin Fretwell Wilson in conjunction with the Fairness for All
Initiative and Tolerance Means Dialogues at the University of Illinois College of Law, and 2018
Baptist Joint Committee for Religious Liberty Fellow. Any views expressed here are in his per-
sonal capacity.
** Roger and Stephany Joslin Professor of Law and Director of the Fairness for All Initia-
tive and Tolerance Means Dialogues at the University of Illinois College of Law. We are grateful
to Professors Tom Berg and Matthew Finkin and the participants in the Religious Freedom and the
Common Good symposium for helpful reactions and comments.
1. See Daniel Frost, Sexually Conservative Religious Universities and Tax Exemption, 59 J.
CHURCH & STATE 566, 596 (2017), http://jcs.oxfordjournals.org/content/early/2016/07/07/
jcs.csw049.full.pdf+html?sid=e83aeebd-dc9d-4b74-aaa0-9a971377c25f (estimating that there are
1,014 religious universities in the United States); Jeffrey J. Selingo, How Many Colleges and
Universities Do We Really Need?, WASH. POST (July 2, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
news/grade-point/wp/2015/07/20/how-many-colleges-and-universities-do-we-really-need/?utm_
term=.0ec007116070 (estimating that there are 5,300 colleges and universities in the United
States).
2. See Shirley V. Hoogstra, Shapri D. LoMaglio & Brad Crofford, Finding a Way Forward
at Covenantal Universities, in RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, LGBT RIGHTS, AND THE PROSPECTS FOR
COMMON GROUND (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Robin Fretwell Wilson eds., 2018).
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plines.3 These “covenantal universities” are engaged principally in
preparing students to act “as Christ’s agents of renewal in the world,” in
whatever career they choose.4 To borrow an image from Professor Stephen
Carter, “covenantal universities” operate at the margin between the secta-
rian and the secular, straddling the wall of separation between church and
state.5
That endeavor of preparing students to live out their faith in every
dimension of their lives—including their careers—places a premium on
having faculty (as well as staff) who share the institution’s religious and
theological views. A recognition that religious organizations generally, and
religious institutions of higher education specially, need the flexibility to
hire and retain employees who share the institution’s faith commitments,
and to conduct their operations consistent with their faith tenets, has been
stamped into federal law and the law of some states. Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 19646 and Title IX of the Education Amendments of 19727
are two examples.
But what happens when an already-hired faculty member takes a vocal
position—in the classroom or outside it—that departs from the theological
commitments or social understandings of a covenantal university? What
happens when an institutional viewpoint is being critiqued from within?
Many look not to the legal regulation of religious universities to resolve
these competing rights, but view the clash through the lens of academic
freedom. Consider, for example, the 2016 dust-up at Wheaton College, the
self-described “explicitly Christian”8 college, which “parted ways” with po-
litical science faculty member Larycia Hawkins. Hawkins had said publicly
a statement that rings as tolerant and inclusive to many— “I stand in relig-
ious solidarity with Muslims because they . . . are people of the book”9—
and wore a headscarf as a symbol of solidarity. But to Wheaton and some
alumni, Hawkins’s statement struck a very different chord: it conflated the
gods of Christianity and Islam, hitting a nerve in an ongoing debate in
Christian circles about whether all faiths are equal paths to God.10 The pre-
3. Michael W. Lee, What Is a Christian School?, PERSPECTIVE (Jan. 11, 2006), at 1, https://
www.cherokeechristian.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/BadMyth-whatisachristianschool.pdf
(positing that such schools “agree with parents to provide a consistent, Christ-centered education”
firmly rooted in Scripture and “strive to enroll only Christian families”).
4. About, CALVIN COLLEGE, https://calvin.edu/about/ (last visited Oct. 20, 2018).
5. Stephen L. Carter, The Constitutional and the Religious University, 47 DEPAUL L. REV.
479, 483 (1998).
6. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.
7. 20 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq.
8. About Wheaton College, WHEATON COLLEGE, https://www.wheaton.edu/about-wheaton/
(last visited Oct. 20, 2018).
9. Ruth Graham, The Professor Suspended for Saying Muslims and Christians Worship One
God, THE ATLANTIC (Dec. 17, 2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/12/chris
tian-college-suspendprofessor/421029/.
10. Id.
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eminent organization for academic freedom promotion in America, the
American Association of University Professors (“AAUP”), which maintains
strong ties with accrediting organizations, 11 observed of Hawkins’s firing:
“The AAUP would prefer that institutions in general don’t place these kinds
of restrictions on academic freedom, but we have historically recognized
the right of religious institutions to do so.”12 A commenter on AAUP’s site
asked whether Wheaton’s faculty are “aware, before they begin to work
there, that Wheaton is an institution that restricts academic freedom?”13
This essay does not attempt to resolve this clash. Instead, it charts the
crosscurrents and tensions between legal protections for the religious free-
dom of religious universities and notions of academic freedom. In brief, the
legal protections for religious freedom of religious universities and organi-
zations move in one direction—favoring Wheaton’s ability to push a spe-
cific theological view through its operations, including the firing and
disciplining of dissenters. Some may reflexively see that prerogative as a
free pass to religious employers to discriminate; yet, just as organizations
like the Sierra Club need not hire a climate change denier,14 religious em-
ployers are not required to hire or retain persons who are fundamentally at
odds with their deepest faith commitments. Moving in the other direction
are notions of academic freedom of individual faculty, which favor the abil-
ity of faculty, like Hawkins, to stake out and announce positions, without
repercussion, that may be at odds with the university that employs them and
its stated mission. This essay contends the AAUP’s historical emphasis on
notice to faculty overlooks a key constituency with as much at stake: stu-
dents themselves. We argue that under conditions of notice to students and
faculty at covenantal universities which self-define as openly operating to
prepare students to be God’s emissaries in the world, the concerns under-
pinning academic freedom—space for faculty to do rigorous academic
work—do not map well onto disputes that are theological.15 In theological
disputes, the covenantal university’s view must prevail in order to accom-
plish its raison d’etre.
11. See infra, Part IV.
12. LauraM, Who Wants to Teach at Wheaton College?, AAUP (Jan 21, 2016), https://
www.aaup.org/content/who-wants-teach-wheaton-college.
13. Id.
14. James D. Nelson, The Freedom of Business Association, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 461, 462
(2015) (“Freedom-of-association law is asymmetrical. Various expressive associations—advocacy
groups, political parties, cultural societies, and religious organizations—are eligible to claim some
degree of institutional autonomy with respect to membership and internal governance. Commer-
cial associations, however, are only entitled to minimal constitutional protection from state regula-
tion. So, while the Boy Scouts can invoke the power of the First Amendment to resist
antidiscrimination laws, no such protection is available to Wal-Mart. Not everyone is pleased with
this associational asymmetry. Indeed, for years critics have forcefully challenged the distinction
between expressive associations and commercial associations.”).
15. Robin Fretwell Wilson, Squaring Faith and Sexuality: Religious Institutions and the
Unique Challenge of Sports, 34 J.L. & INEQUALITY 385, 391 (2016).
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This essay explores a standard borrowed from Title VII itself and asks
whether it can meld meaningful religious liberty with meaningful academic
freedom. Part I highlights the distinctive characteristics of covenantal uni-
versities. Part II canvasses types of academic freedom conflicts inside and
outside university environments and notes that the university has academic
freedom interests in addition to those of faculty. Part III sketches the thick
legal protection of institutional religious liberty of religious universities
under Title VII and Title IX, and argues that the legal norms under the
former, which permits religious employers to “religiously discriminate,”
provide a coherent line for when we should respect the institutional relig-
ious freedom of covenantal universities or when we should instead tilt in
favor of the faculty member’s individual academic freedom. Part IV ex-
plores how the AAUP has fluctuated in its stance towards religiously affili-
ated colleges and universities, emphasizing both rigor of inquiry and “flying
under false colors.” Part V then recognizes that difficult cases fall on differ-
ent sides of the line borrowed from Title VII for melding institutional relig-
ious liberty and academic freedom. Part VI discusses the mechanics of
notice at religious institutions and how it responds to the concerns under-
pinning academic freedom. Ultimately, this essay concludes that an overly
thick notion of academic freedom for faculty at covenantal colleges and
universities threatens to wash out the religious character of those institu-
tions. Borrowing a page from the treatment of religious employers and uni-
versities under federal employment law respects two important values:
institutional religious liberty and individual academic freedom.
II. THE RICH TAPESTRY OF RELIGIOUS UNIVERSITIES
Of the 5,300 colleges and universities sprawled across the United
States,16 1,014 of them, roughly one-fifth, have ties to a religious organiza-
tion.17 Given that many of America’s oldest colleges and universities were
founded by religious orders,18 this makes sense. These institutions of higher
education are diverse. They vary in mission, character, scholarly engage-
ment, and religious affiliation.
While scholars have offered other taxonomies of religiously affiliated
universities,19 it is useful to array organizations along a spectrum from the
most obviously sectarian—seminaries, whose mission is to train students to
16. Selingo, supra note 1.
17. Frost, supra note 1.
18. Paulo Turchioe, The Best Religiously Affiliated Colleges, FORBES (May 21, 2010), https://
www.forbes.com/2010/05/21/religiously-affiliated-colleges-leadership-education-best.html#a4d0f
006aee6.
19. For example, another “taxonomy” of the “universe of church-affiliated institutions” di-
vides religious educational institutions into three categories: (1) “non-affirming college[s],” which
give little formal attention to religion; (2) “free Christian (or Jewish) college[s],” which stand for
both religious and liberal education; and (3) “defender[s] of the faith,” whose purpose is to edu-
cate people who will become leaders in a particular religious tradition. Matthew W. Finkin et al.,
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propagate the faith—to schools that are “religious in name only” and are
virtually indistinguishable from secular institutions,20 as Figure 1 does.
FIGURE 1 DEGREE OF RELIGIOSITY AT RELIGIOUSLY AFFILIATED
SCHOOLS
Of course, categorizing institutions along a spectrum of religiosity is not an
exact science. Moreover, schools along the continuum may be more or less
rigorous and challenging with respect to how they prepare students in non-
theological subjects.
Theological seminaries train students to instruct others in a particular
doctrinal tradition and mode, usually for careers within that tradition as
ministers, priests, imams, etc.21 A classic example, Princeton Theological
Seminary, states its mission as preparing “women and men to serve Jesus
Christ in ministries marked by faith, integrity, scholarship, competence,
compassion, and joy, equipping them for leadership worldwide in congrega-
tions and the larger church, in classrooms and the academy, and in the pub-
lic arena.”22 One of its “four distinctive commitments” is a “community of
The “Limitations” Clause in the 1940 Statement of Principles, 74 ACADEME 52, 53 (1988) (quot-
ing M. PATTILLO, JR. & D. MACKENZIE, EIGHT HUNDRED COLLEGES FACE THE FUTURE (1965)).
20. Wilson, supra note 15, at 415.
21. Seminary, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/175684?rskey
=AFTceN&result=1&isAdvanced=false#eid (last visited June 20, 2016).
22. Mission & Vision, PRINCETON THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY, http://www.ptsem.edu/discover/
mission-vision (last visited Oct. 20, 2018).
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learning [that] nurtures intellectual curiosity and fosters theological
research.”23
Hyles-Anderson College identifies not as a seminary but as a “Bible
college.” 24 It has the goal of producing “well-rounded servant leaders who
will do great works for God” through majors in only Bible and mission
studies, elementary and secondary education, music, media, secretarial
studies, and marriage and motherhood.25 Its other educational offerings—
minors; one-, two-, and three-year programs; and graduate degrees—are
equally limited, bounded to the same subjects as the major offerings.26
But most of America’s religious universities and colleges have looser
ties with religion and train students in secular disciplines—from the sci-
ences to the liberal arts. These institutions themselves range from covenan-
tal schools, which expressly integrate religious belief into degree
programs;27 to religiously affiliated schools where the primary religious in-
fluence may be the common religious identity of the campus community,
not the content of class discussions;28 to nominally religious schools, which
may have cut formal ties to their historical religious roots or maintain that
relationship in name only.
Many of the clashes of values between a university’s religious freedom
and its faculty’s academic freedom occur at covenantal schools. Covenantal
universities and colleges seek to train students for careers in a large number
of secular disciplines, while integrating faith into the everyday experience
of its students through “[c]hapel and worship services, student-led Bible
studies, and conversations over coffee with a Campus Ministries chap-
lain.”29 A covenantal school, like Calvin College in Grand Rapids, Michi-
gan, does not see its general educational mission as divorced from its
education of students in the faith—quite the contrary, the university’s stated
goal is to equip students “to think deeply, to act justly, and to live whole-
heartedly as Christ’s agents of renewal in the world.” 30
23. Id.
24. About Hyles Anderson College, HYLES-ANDERSON COLLEGE, https://hylesanderson.edu/
about/ (last visited Oct. 20, 2018).
25. Id.; Academic Department, HYLES-ANDERSON COLLEGE, https://hylesanderson.edu/pro
grams-and-courses/ (last visited Oct. 19, 2018).
26. Id.
27. See, e.g., Our Purpose, COVENANT COLLEGE, https://www.covenant.edu/about/who/pur
pose (last visited Oct. 20, 2018); see also Kaye Cook & Cynthia Neal Kimball, Is a Christian
College Education ‘Worth It’? Worldview Development Among Christian College Students as a
Model for the Larger Academy, GORDON COLLEGE (2011), http://www.gordon.edu/download/
pages/Is%20a%20Christian%20College%20Education%20Worth%20it.pdf.
28. See, e.g., Mission, UNIV. OF NOTRE DAME, https://www.nd.edu/about/mission/ (last vis-
ited Oct. 20, 2018).
29. Faith and Worship, CALVIN COLLEGE, https://calvin.edu/student-life/faith-worship/ (last
visited Oct. 19, 2018).
30. CALVIN COLLEGE, supra note 4.
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Wheaton College places a similar emphasis on faith in its educational
offerings: its website declares, it is “an explicitly Christian, academically
rigorous, fully residential liberal arts college and graduate school.”31 Part
and parcel of this identity is Wheaton College’s doctrinal statement of faith,
which “defines the biblical perspective that informs a Wheaton educa-
tion.”32 “Reaffirmed annually by its Board of Trustees, faculty, and staff,”
the statement dates back to 1924 and sets forth Wheaton’s view of the na-
ture of God, the creation, the relevance of scripture, the centrality of Jesus
Christ, and the afterlife.33 Wheaton College maintains a video series about
how its faith statement integrates with the academic pursuits of its faculty.34
For some schools with religious pasts or present-day connections to
religious communities, their educational mission and the academic freedom
of their faculty go hand in hand. The University of Notre Dame, for exam-
ple, places its educational mission in context of three characteristics of Ro-
man Catholicism: “Jesus Christ, his Gospel, and his Spirit.”35 But “[w]hat
the University asks of all its scholars and students . . . is not a particular
creedal affiliation, but a respect for the objectives of Notre Dame and a
willingness to enter into the conversation that gives it life and character.”36
Notre Dame believes that “no genuine search for the truth in the human or
the cosmic order is alien to the life of faith.”37 Not surprisingly, then, Notre
Dame “insists upon academic freedom [because] that makes open discus-
sion and inquiry possible.”38
This commitment to academic freedom does not mean that the univer-
sity is emptied of serious scholars of Catholicism or of its Catholic identity.
Notre Dame’s Catholic identity “depends upon, and is nurtured by, the con-
tinuing presence of a predominate number of Catholic intellectuals.”39 In
the “free inquiry and open discussion” Notre Dame fosters, “various lines
of Catholic thought may intersect with all the forms of knowledge found in
the arts, sciences, professions, and every other area of human scholarship
and creativity.”40 As a Catholic institution, faith commitments infuse many
31. WHEATON COLLEGE, supra note 8.
32. Statement of Faith and Educational Purpose, WHEATON COLLEGE, https://
www.wheaton.edu/about-wheaton/statement-of-faith-and-educational-purpose/ (last visited Oct.
20, 2018).
33. Id.
34. Statement of Faith Video Series, WHEATON COLLEGE, https://www.wheaton.edu/about-
wheaton/statement-of-faith-and-educational-purpose/statement-of-faith-series/ (last visited Oct.
20, 2018).
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of Notre Dame’s operational decisions.41 In its “pursuit and sharing of truth
for its own sake,”42 Notre Dame has become one of the most prestigious
universities in the country, 43 topping charts for the number of fellowships,
44
 grants,45 and research awards.46
However, many religiously affiliated colleges and universities leave
considerably less room for dissenting opinion than Notre Dame does, at
least on matters of religious doctrine. And this brings us to the nub of the
clash: when should a religious educational institution’s desire to advance its
religious mission through teaching and scholarship, which in many cases is
its raison d’eˆtre, yield to providing its faculty with academic freedom, even
when doing so results in scholarship the institution considers heretical, blas-
phemous, or profane? Is there a place for the institution shaping and binding
its own community to its religious commitments?
Covenantal schools occupy a unique position in society. As Professor
Carter puts it, they sit squarely on top of the wall of separation between
church and state; from this vantage point, they can view and participate in
conversations happening on either side of the wall.47 More importantly,
covenantal schools can act as mediators in society—fluent enough in both
sectors of society to translate the experience of the sectarian to the secular
and the secular to the sectarian, in languages that both understand.48
41. For example, after the contraceptive coverage mandate under the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act (“ACA”) went into effect, Notre Dame first sued for an exemption from the
mandate, lost the lawsuit, and in 2014 began providing birth control to students. Emma Green,
Notre Dame Switches Its Position on Birth-Control Coverage—Again, THE ATLANTIC (Feb. 7,
2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2018/02/notre-dame-switches-its-position-on-
contraception-coverage-again/552605/. After the Trump administration’s issuance of new rules
under the ACA in 2017, Notre Dame reversed course, availing itself of the religious accommoda-
tion. Id. It then experienced a backlash from discontinuing coverage; just a month later, Notre
Dame again began providing some forms of birth control. Id. Litigation currently ensues over
Notre Dame’s decision to not provide all forms of contraception to its students. Erin B. Logan,
Students Sue University of Notre Dame for Restricting Access to Some Birth Control, WASH. POST
(June 27, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/to-your-health/wp/2018/06/27/students-
sue-university-of-notre-dame-for-restricting-access-to-some-birth-control/?utm_term=.883e452d5
832.
42. Univ. of Notre Dame, supra note 28.
43. University of Notre Dame, U.S. NEWS, https://www.usnews.com/best-colleges/notre-
dame-1840/overall-rankings (last visited Oct. 20, 2018) (ranking Notre Dame eighteenth
nationally).
44. Notre Dame Research, UNIV. OF NOTRE DAME, https://research.nd.edu/ (last visited Oct.
20, 2018) (the university has been ranked first in the nation for National Endowment for the
Humanities fellowships since 1999).
45. This Is Notre Dame, UNIV. OF NOTRE DAME (2017–18), https://www.nd.edu/assets/docs/
this-is-notre-dame.pdf (Notre Dame maintains thirty-one grants in twenty-four countries, totaling
$18 million.)
46. Id. (in fiscal year 2017 alone, Notre Dame pulled in $138 million in research awards.)
47. Stephen L. Carter, The Constitutional and the Religious University, 47 DEPAUL L. REV.
479, 494–95 (1998).
48. Id.
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Covenantal universities are the situses for inscribing and strengthening
a particular worldview in young adults belonging to a particular faith tradi-
tion, making their operation a matter of existential concern.49 As Professor
Michael McConnell observed, these universities are the means “by which
religious faiths can preserve and transmit their teachings from one genera-
tion to the next, particularly for nonmainstream religions whose differences
from the predominant academic culture are so substantial that they risk an-
nihilation if they cannot retain a degree of separation.”50 These universities
also act as a unique meeting ground for individuals interested in romantic
and marital partners with the same faith commitments, which itself is essen-
tial to transmitting faith across generations. 51 But to perform these func-
tions, the university at a minimum needs everyone singing from the same
sheet of music, theologically. Nothing less is at stake than “the ability of
nonmainstream religions to maintain their identity and proclaim their vision
in secular America.”52
This push and pull around secular and sectarian commitments at cove-
nantal schools is very real. Institutionally, university leaders are often ac-
countable to religious leaders or even board members who share that faith
tradition, creating a significant push toward orthodoxy and adherence to
doctrine.53 Universities and colleges are also evaluated by organizations,
like the AAUP, dedicated to individual academic freedom, and may be
“censured”—that is, called out publicly—if the institution subjects a faculty
member to sanction for taking an independent stand in their work.
Moreover, if a school of higher education tacks too hard towards func-
tioning only as a seminary or Bible college, it loses the dual role of prepar-
ing young believers to assume influential roles in secular society.
Conversely, if a covenantal university tacks too hard in the direction of
preparing students in everything but the faith, it no longer can perform its
49. Robin Fretwell Wilson, Introduction, in THE CONTESTED PLACE OF RELIGION IN FAMILY
LAW 10 (Robin Fretwell Wilson ed., 2018).
50. Michael W. McConnell, Academic Freedom in Religious Colleges and Universities, 304
L. AND CONTEMP. PROB. 303, 316 (1990).
51. Cara Newlon, College Students Still Often Find Spouses on Campus, USA TODAY (Oct.
17, 2013), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2013/10/15/college-marriage-facebook/
2989039/; Katherine Burgess, Looking to Get Married? Try a Christian College, WASH. POST
(Oct. 11, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/on-faith/looking-to-get-married-try-a-
christian-college/2013/10/11/ef6fed4c-32b3-11e3-ad00-ec4c6b31cbed_story.html?utm_term=.65f
8c6570d76 (“[O]f the top 25 colleges where men are most likely to meet their spouse, all are
private Christian institutions. For women, more than half (64 percent) of the top 25 colleges where
they’re likely to find a husband are religious schools.”).
52. McConnell, supra note 50, at 304.
53. See, e.g., Kevin Baird, An Open letter to President David Wright (Indiana Wesleyan
University), TRUE DISCIPLES (Mar. 1, 2016), http://drkevinbaird.com/wp/2016/03/01/an-open-let
ter-to-president-david-wright-indiana-wesleyan-university/.
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function of transmitting faith across generations—at a moment when more
conservative faith traditions feel unsure of their place in society.54
Professor Carter captured how delicate and precarious the position of
covenantal universities is with a metaphor of the covenantal university sit-
ting atop the wall between the “garden”—a sectarian place not of the
world—and the “wilderness,” the world most of us occupy:
[T]the risk is real for any school that allows, as Lovejoy put it,
“ecclesiastical authority” to decide what propositions its faculty
members may or may not defend: the risk is that the school will
tumble off the wall into the garden. The garden is not a bad place
to be, and dwelling there may well be better than dwelling in the
wilderness. But if a university is in the garden only, it can never
fulfill its mediating role of translating each for the other.55
Professor Tom Berg has labelled such universities that have one foot in
the world and the other foot out of the world “partly acculturated.”56 Profes-
sor Berg believes such organizations are positioned to do significant work,
providing education and social services, because their focus is set, at least
partly, toward the outside world.
This essay considers only one of the many collisions in this zone of
risk57 for covenantal universities straddling these two spheres—struggles
about the very religious understandings foundational to the universities
themselves.
54. Charles Mathewes, White Christianity Is in Big Trouble. And It’s Its Own Biggest
Threat., WASH. POST (Dec. 19, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/posteverything/wp/
2017/12/19/white-christianity-is-in-big-trouble-and-its-its-own-biggest-threat/?utm_term=.2d65e
7bd2328 (noting “Christians’ fears about losing control of the culture”); Kelsey Dallas, Conserva-
tive Christians and Religious ‘Nones’ Fear Each Other, But It’s More About Politics Than Faith,
DESERET NEWS, (Sept. 7, 2017), https://www.deseretnews.com/article/865688296/Conservative-
Christians-and-religious-nones-fear-each-other-but-its-more-about-politics-than.html (“Around
half of evangelicals say that . . . atheists want to limit their freedom. . . .”).
55. Carter, supra note 47.
56. See generally Thomas C. Berg, Partly Acculturated Religious Activity: A Case for Ac-
commodating Religious Nonprofits, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1341 (2016).
57. The AAUP polices many aspects of the relationship between universities and their
faculty. See, e.g., AAUP Adds University of Nebraska-Lincoln to Censure List for Violations of
Principles, AAUP (June 16, 2018), https://www.aaup.org/news/aaup-adds-university-nebraska
%E2%80%93lincoln-censure-list-violations-principles#.W5rj9pNKiuU (deeming a university to
have violated academic freedom for suspending and failing to reinstate a doctoral student with a
part-time appointment following her protest of an on-campus recruitment table for a political
organization); see also Academic Freedom and Tenure: University of the Cumberlands, AAUP
(Mar.–Apr. 2005), at 108, https://www.aaup.org/file/Academic-Freedom-and-Tenure-University-
of-the-Cumberlands_0.pdf (criticizing a university’s academic freedom statements in its policies
and procedures as being subject to abuse); Academic Freedom and Tenure: The University of
Southern Maine, AAUP (2015), at 14, https://www.aaup.org/file/USM%20report.pdf (last visited
Oct. 20, 2018) (discussing possible administrative retaliation against faculty members who had
voiced criticism of the administration).
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III. WHEN ACADEMIC FREEDOM AND RELIGIOUS FREEDOM OVERLAP
AND DIVERGE
Both the university and its professors possess academic freedom as
well as religious freedom, or would like to. Sometimes these protections
overlap or align; other times, they diverge, as Table 1 graphically
illustrates.
TABLE 1
OVERLAPPING AND DIVERGING PROTECTIONS
Faculty University
Box 1. Religious Freedom Box 2. Religious Freedom
Box 3. Academic Freedom Box 4. Academic Freedom
Statutory law has long protected the religious beliefs or practices of
individuals and, although controversial, institutions.58 Like these legal pro-
tections, “[a]cademic freedom . . . has two faces: one individual, the other
institutional.”59 These aspects, Boxes 3 and 4, align when outside forces
attempt to control the scope or content of research done by individual
faculty: such a move “takes away the scholar’s freedom of research or
teaching, and it also takes away the institution’s exclusive authority to gov-
ern academic matters within its walls.”60
During the McCarthy era, for instance, institutional academic freedom
shielded not only institutions but their faculty members—that is, Boxes 3
and 4 aligned.61 Thus, when the House Un-American Activities Committee
stirred public opinion against communism, several Harvard University
faculty members were accused of being communists.62 Senator Eugene Mc-
Carthy called upon Harvard to fire one especially vocal professor, Wendell
Furry.63 Harvard’s president said he could not promise that64 and denied
58. See Michael W. McConnell, The Problem of Singling Out Religion, 50 DEPAUL L. REV.
1, 5 (2010) (“A recent survey of federal and state law revealed that the terms ‘religion’ or ‘relig-
ious’ appear over 14,000 times, and religious exemptions appear in over 2,000 statutes.”); James
E. Ryan, Smith and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act: An Iconoclastic Assessment, 78 VA.
L. REV. 1407, 1445–50 (1992) (same). For reviews of, and a range of views on, protections for
individual religious freedom versus institutional religious freedom, see THE RISE OF CORPORATE
RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 257 (Micah Schwartzman, Chad Flanders & Zoe¨ Robinson eds., Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 2016).
59. McConnell, supra note 50, at 305.
60. Id.
61. Id. (“In such a case, the two aspects of academic freedom are in harmony.”).
62. Ben W. Heineman, Jr., The University in the McCarthy Era, THE HARVARD CRIMSON
(Sept. 22, 1965), https://www.thecrimson.com/article/1965/9/22/the-university-in-the-mccarthy-
era/.
63. Id.
64. Jeff Magalif, Pusey’s Non-Defense of Academic Freedom, THE HARVARD CRIMSON (Sep.
21, 1970), https://www.thecrimson.com/article/1970/9/21/puseys-non-defense-of-academic-free
dom-psenator/.
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knowledge of any communists on Harvard’s faculty.65 Harvard’s assertion
of its exclusive authority to govern the breadth of operations within its
walls aligned with the individual academic freedom interests of its profes-
sors, whatever their opinions of communism. These faculty members held
onto their positions at Harvard.
Other institutions gave greater heed to McCarthy’s accusations. City
College of New York (“CUNY”), for instance, dismissed a handful of
professors after McCarthy named them as communists.66 One can think of
this pitiable outcome as a crushing of CUNY’s academic freedom (Box 4)
that also left unprotected CUNY’s professors’ individual academic freedom
(Box 3).
In other instances, a university may assert both a religious freedom
prerogative to shape its own operations consonant with its faith tenets and
an academic freedom right to do so, too—Boxes 2 and 4 in Table 1. In such
instances, the university as an entity may be in conflict with prevailing
norms in the academy or society at large. For instance, some medical
schools object to teaching their students how to perform an abortion, a
claim that sounds both in religious freedom and academic freedom.67
Schools that take this stance risk being perceived as out of step with the
profession, or worse, as illegitimate and unworthy of accreditation because
students graduate without being trained for the full range of services they
may be called upon to perform. However, in 1996, Congress chose to pro-
tect medical schools’ ability to follow their missions by passing the Coats/
Snowe Amendment.68 That law insulated medical schools from repercus-
sions by the federal government and private accreditation organizations if a
school chose not to teach their students how to perform abortions.69 The
Coats/Snowe Amendment serves as an example of institutional religious
65. Pusey Answers Communism Charge; McCarthy to Cite Furry for Contempt, THE
HARVARD CRIMSON (Nov. 10, 1953), https://www.thecrimson.com/article/1953/11/10/pusey-an
swers-communism-charge-mccarthy-to/.
66. Paul L. Montgomery, 10 Teachers Ousted in 50’s Given Restitution from City, N.Y.
TIMES (Apr. 29, 1982), https://www.nytimes.com/1982/04/29/nyregion/10-teachers-ousted-in-50-
s-given-restitution-from-city.html.
67. See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2779 (2014) (finding cover-
age requirement of drugs or devices the objecting closely held corporations viewed as abor-
tifacients to be a burden on the closely held corporations’ religious practice for purpose of the
federal Religious Freedom Restoration Act); Kira Brekke, Med Schools Vary on Abortion Instruc-
tion, THE GW HATCHET (Mar. 2, 2010) https://www.gwhatchet.com/2010/03/29/med-schools-
vary-on-abortion-instruction/.
68. 42 U.S.C. § 238n (1996).
69. Id. (“In determining whether to grant a legal status to a health care entity (including a
license or certificate), or to provide such entity with financial assistance, services or other benefits,
the Federal Government, or any State or local government that receives Federal financial assis-
tance, shall deem accredited any postgraduate physician training program that would be accredited
but for the accrediting agency’s reliance upon an accreditation standards that requires an entity to
perform an induced abortion or require, provide, or refer for training in the performance of in-
duced abortions, or make arrangements for such training, regardless of whether such standard
provides exceptions or exemptions. The government involved shall formulate such regulations or
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liberty receiving statutory protection despite intellectual disagreement in the
academy at large, vindicating both the school’s religious freedom (Box 2)
and its academic freedom (Box 4). Obviously, if a faculty member feels
strongly that all physicians should know how to care for women needing an
abortion, say in cases of miscarriage or for personal desire, that faculty
member’s academic freedom may be infringed. 70 And if the faculty mem-
ber believes this for religious reasons, the faculty member’s religious liberty
arguably has been infringed71—that is, in the name of the school’s own
academic freedom, the school chooses precisely what it will educate (and
not educate) students about.
But disagreements like those between Wheaton College and Hawkins
implicate Wheaton’s religious and academic freedom (Boxes 2 and 4) as
well as the academic freedom (Box 3) and even religious freedom (Box 1)
of faculty like Hawkins.72 As the next Part shows, when Hawkins uttered
the words “Muslims . . . are people of the book”73 and her employer, Whea-
ton, objected to the statement as not “accept[ing] and model[ing] the State-
ment of Faith of the College and/or the Community Covenant,” which
details Wheaton’s view of the nature of God,74 Title VII sides with Whea-
ton—adding to the thick autonomy of religious organizations to decide who
speaks for them on religious matters, a principle crystalized by the U.S.
Supreme Court in Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v.
E.E.O.C.75
other mechanisms, or enter into such agreements with accrediting agencies, as are necessary to
comply with this subsection.”).
70. A Doctor Tells Why She Performed Abortions—And Still Would, HEALTH AFFAIRS (June
2010), https://www.healthaffairs.org/doi/full/10.1377/hlthaff.2009.0775 (noting that “there aren’t
any conscience rules in place to protect people who, if their home institution believes otherwise,
provide medications or procedures they believe would save a life—the mother’s”).
71. Cf. Frederick Mark Gedicks, Exemptions from the ‘Contraception Mandate’ Threaten
Religious Liberty, WASH. POST (Jan. 15, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/exemp
tions-from-the-contraception-mandate-threaten-religious-liberty/2014/01/15/f5cb9bd0-7d79-11e3-
93c1-0e888170b723_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_term=.667335615c60.
72. Of course, Hawkins may have had a statutory claim against Wheaton if state law like that
in Utah had given her protection for speech in the workplace. See Robin Fretwell Wilson, Com-
mon Ground Lawmaking: Lessons for Peaceful Coexistence from Masterpiece Cakeshop and the
Utah Compromise, UNIV. CONN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2018) (“Utah provided that lawful, non-
harassing speech about an employee’s religious, moral, or political beliefs, whether expressed
inside or outside the workplace, cannot be the basis for taking action against an employee.”); Utah
Code § 34A-5-112 (2018). To our knowledge, Illinois has no such law.
73. Wilson, supra note 72.
74. Id.; Ruth Graham, The Professor Wore a Hijab in Solidarity—Then Lost Her Job, N.Y.
TIMES (Oct. 13, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/16/magazine/the-professor-wore-a-
hijab-in-solidarity-then-lost-her-job.html.
75. 565 U.S. 171 (2012). Wheaton and Hawkins ultimately reached a settlement to “part
ways” after finding “a mutual place of resolution and reconciliation.” Christine Hauser, Wheaton
College and Professor to ‘Part Ways’ After Her Remarks on Muslims, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 8, 2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/09/us/larycia-hawkins-wheaton-college.html.
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IV. SOURCES OF INSTITUTIONAL RELIGIOUS LIBERTY
To probe the appropriateness of academic freedom’s reach into institu-
tional religious liberty, it is important to understand the backdrop of long-
standing laws providing religious liberty protections to religious employers
and religious universities in particular.
A. Constitutional Sources of Institutional Religious Liberty
As a result of the U.S. Supreme Court’s much-debated decision in Em-
ployment Division v. Smith,76 religious individuals and institutions must fol-
low general rules of neutral applicability like every other person covered by
a law. Thus, for most actions (absent statutory protections), religious actors
have little recourse under the First Amendment against burdens on their
religious practice. 77 But in one significant realm—who speaks for churches
and religious institutions on matters of faith—the First Amendment’s Relig-
ion Clauses creates a zone of autonomy. 78
Thus, in Hosanna-Tabor,79 the Court held that the ministerial excep-
tion, grounded in the First Amendment’s Establishment and Free Exercise
Clauses, applies to a “called teacher” who works in a church-affiliated
school, barring recovery against the school under the Americans with Disa-
bilities Act. The lawsuit, brought by the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (“EEOC”) on behalf of Cheryl Perich, an elementary school
teacher, arose after Perich and the school disagreed on accommodations the
school made for Perich’s narcolepsy.80 The school believed the dispute
should be mediated, not litigated, because “Christians should resolve their
76. 494 U.S. 872 (1990). Whether the Smith decision was correctly decided or encroached
improperly on free exercise remains a deeply contested question. See, e.g., Douglas Laycock, The
Religious Exemption Debate, 11 RUTGERS J. L. & RELIGION. 139, 150 (contemplating the effects
of Smith); Symposium, Twenty Years After Employment Division v. Smith: Assessing the Twenti-
eth Century’s Landmark Case on the Free Exercise of Religion and How It Changed History, 32
CARDOZO L. REV. 1655 (2011) (discussing Smith).
77. Of course, one cannot target religious actors or impose special burdens upon them with-
out facing strict scrutiny review, see Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah,
508 U.S. 520 (1993), nor can courts disparage religious groups and individuals when adjudicating
the application of laws—the latter are entitled to “fairness and impartiality” and a “neutral deci-
sion-maker who would give full and fair consideration to [their] religious objection[s].” Master-
piece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1729–32 (2018).
78. Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 188–90, 193–94.
79. See id.
80. Id. at 178–79. The school gave Perich disability leave for an entire school year, arranging
coverage by another teacher during Perich’s absence. Id. Halfway through the school year, Perich
informed the school she was ready to come back. Id. The school was concerned Perich was not yet
ready to return and explained that the substitute teacher’s contract extended to the end of the
school year. Id. Perhaps because of the unfortunate situation, the congregation supporting the
school “offered to pay a portion of Perich’s health insurance premiums in exchange for her resig-
nation as a called teacher.” Id. But Perich refused to resign; talks with the school deteriorated as
she threatened to sue, resulting in her termination. Id.
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disputes internally.” 81 The EEOC sued the school for disability discrimina-
tion after the school terminated Perich for threatening to sue the school.82
The unanimous decision rested in significant part on the teacher’s status as
a “called teacher,” which was based on an overall assessment of the
teacher’s role—teaching “a religion class four days a week,” leading “stu-
dents in prayer and devotional exercises each day,” and leading chapel ser-
vice “about twice a year”83—and on the church’s own understanding of that
role.84 In allowing the termination to stand,85 the Court also cited a non-
entanglement principle that gives space to religious actors on core questions
of the faith: “[W]henever the questions of discipline, or of faith, or ecclesi-
astical rule, custom, or law have been decided by the highest of [the] church
judicatories to which the matter has been carried, the legal tribunals must
accept such decisions as final, and as binding on them.”86 Here, if the Court
had decided Perich was not a minister for purposes of the “ministerial ex-
ception,” as some had urged,87 it may have determined the school en-
croached on her contract rights—the Court expressly reserved the question
of whether the ministerial exception “bars other types of suits, including
actions by employees alleging breach of contract or tortious conduct by
their religious employers.”88 But because Perich was a called teacher, “re-
quiring the Church to accept a minister it did not want . . . would have
plainly violated the Church’s freedom under the Religion Clauses to select
its own ministers.”89
This non-entanglement principle has been used to dispatch claims of
discrimination against religious employers on other grounds. For example,
in Curay-Cramer v. Ursuline Acad. of Wilmington, Delaware, Inc.,90 a pri-
vate Catholic school fired a female teacher after she signed her name to a
pro-choice advertisement in a local newspaper. She sued for sex discrimina-
tion in violation of Title VII, alleging that the school did not fire men for
similar departures from Church doctrine, such as engaging in anti-war
81. Id. at 180.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 178.
84. Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 177–80.
85. Id. at 192.
86. Id. at 185–86 (quoting Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. 679, 727 (1871)).
87. See Marci Hamilton, The Ministerial Exception Makes It to the Supreme Court, PATHEOS
(Mar. 31, 2011), http://www.patheos.com/resources/additional-resources/2011/03/ministerial-ex
ception-makes-it-to-the-supreme-court-marci-hamilton-04-01-2011 (observing that “[i]f the
church school wins this case, which it should not, I think that Congress and the state legislatures
owe it to potential employees of religious institutions to warn them of their lack of protection from
invidious discrimination. Most come into such institutions expecting that they will receive better
treatment than your average corporation. Without such a warning, employees unwittingly place
themselves in a position of weakness and risk at work [ ]” and calling strongly for disclosure in
the employer’s employment contracts).
88. Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 196.
89. Id. at 194.
90. 450 F.3d 130 (3d Cir. 2006).
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speech.91 The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit declined
to review the teacher’s firing because doing so “would require an analysis
of Catholic doctrine” about the inherently religious questions of “when life
begins and the responsibility to preserve life in utero.”92 Even if it could
engage in a principled adjudication of the case, the Court observed, “the
process of the review itself might be excessive entanglement.” 93
The academic freedom struggles like those between Wheaton and
Hawkins implicate the non-entanglement principle. At bottom, the clash of
views between Wheaton and Hawkins concerned a question of theology,
with Hawkins taking one position and Wheaton another. Had the parties not
reached an agreement, reviewing whether Hawkins had a contractual or
other claim against Wheaton94 may entangle the courts into religious dis-
putes they cannot referee.95 This non-entanglement principle animates the
structure of religious “exemptions” from the general duty of covered em-
ployers not to discriminate on religious grounds under Title VII, as the next
subpart explains.
B. Statutory Sources of Institutional Religious Liberty
Statutory exemptions in civil rights laws preserving the ability to self-
govern in certain key respects act as a second bulwark around religious
liberty. Most notable here are explicit protections in Title VII to hire co-
religionists and a categorical exemption in Title IX for universities to oper-
ate in accordance with the university’s own religious tenets.
1. Title VII
Consider first Title VII, which bans discrimination on the basis of race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin.96 Section 702(a) provides “This title
shall not apply to . . . educational institutions . . . with respect to the em-
ployment of individuals of a particular religion to perform work connected
with the carrying on by such corporation, association, educational institu-
tion, or society of its activities.”97 That specific statutory protection acts to
91. Id. at 132.
92. Id. at 140 (quoting Curay–Cramer v. Ursuline Acad. of Wilmington, Del., Inc., 344 F.
Supp. 2d 923, 934 (D. Del. 2004)).
93. Id. at 139 (quoting Little v. Wuerl, 929 F.2d 944, 949 (3d Cir. 1991)).
94. Some covenantal universities in their employee handbooks provide that “[n]o teaching or
support of a position inconsistent with these Articles of Faith will be tolerated on the part of any
employee of the University.” BIOLA UNIV., BIOLA UNIVERSITY EMPLOYEE HANDBOOK § 1.2, at 3
(rev. 2014), http://offices.biola.edu/hr/ehandbook/static/media/pdf/1.2.pdf. Such a statement pre-
sumably provides sufficient notice for faculty under the AAUP’s guidance, but would not provide
notice to prospective students. See Part VI.
95. One should recognize how unprotected and exposed this leaves employees of faith-based
groups—like ministers themselves—when they take a view contrary to church authorities. See
Hamilton, supra note 87.
96. Wilson, supra note 15, at 403.
97. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1 (2012).
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place religious employers—which would otherwise be barred from making
hiring and retention decisions on a religious basis—in the same position as
other employers that take seriously the ideological commitments of their
workers to the organization’s core values, as many environmental advocacy
or women’s rights groups do.98 Moreover, while a worker’s private relig-
ious beliefs are simply not germane to their ability to, say, work at Whole
Foods or eBay, or the overwhelming majority of employers in the U.S., this
protection reflects Congress’ judgment that for religious employers, the re-
ligious views of those working for the organization are germane.
In other words, educational institutions are exempted from Title VII’s
ban on religious discrimination in the workplace because they need to “dis-
criminate” in employment decisions to hire a workforce whose values
match their values and mission. Importantly, religious institutions receive a
defense to claims of religious discrimination, but not a categorical exemp-
tion from all discrimination claims—they cannot discriminate on the basis
of sex or other protected classes under Title VII.99
Section 703(e)(2) provides a second statutory protection for religiously
affiliated universities:
[I]t shall not be an unlawful employment practice for a . . . uni-
versity . . . to hire and employ employees of a particular religion
if such . . . university . . . is, in whole or in substantial part,
owned, supported, controlled, or managed by a particular religion
or by a particular religious corporation, association, or society, or
if the curriculum of such . . . university . . . is directed toward the
propagation of a particular religion.100
This section protects the ability for religious educational institutions that
use their curricula to propagate the faith—much as Wheaton does—to hire
only persons who share its articles of faith.101 It also protects religiously
affiliated universities that are controlled by religious groups even if the
school does not infuse faith in every dimension of its operations.102 Section
98. It is nonsensical, for example, for Planned Parenthood to be required to retain an em-
ployee who is virulently opposed to abortion. See Michelle L. Price, LGBT Anti-discrimination
Bill Passes Utah Test, PBS NEWS (Mar. 6, 2015), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/nation/lgbt-anti-
discrimination-bill-passes-utah-test (quoting Professor Robin Fretwell Wilson as saying, “If, for
example, I worked at Planned Parenthood, it would be totally appropriate for them to say you
can’t wear one of those little buttons that has the ‘Right to Life,’ with the fetus on it”).
99. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2, 2000e-3 (2012). See generally Wilson, supra note 15.
100. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (2012).
101. For an explanation of how the exemptions from Sections 702 and 703 overlap with the
other protected grounds in Title VII, see Wilson, supra note 15, at 446 n.291.
102. Some have argued that Title VII extends a categorical religious exemption, relying on
cases like Kennedy v. St. Joseph’s Ministries, Inc., 657 F.3d 189 (4th Cir. 2011), which interpreted
the term “employment” broadly under Section 702(a) to reach all employment actions, including
retaliation suits brought against religious employers, which the Court found were barred. Carl
Esbeck, Federal Contractors, Title VII, and LGBT Employment Discrimination: Can Religious
Organizations Continue To Staff on a Religious Basis?, 2015 OXFORD J.L. & RELIGION. 368, 380
(“the logic of Kennedy necessarily applies to claims for discrimination on the basis of race, colour,
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703(e)(2)’s protection also operates as a defense to claims of “religious dis-
crimination,” permitting religious universities to define and shape their
communities—not only their educators, but their administration and staff—
by adherence to particular theological commitments. In other words, cove-
nantal universities can require that everyone drink the same theological
Kool-Aid.
Cases decided under Sections 702(a) and 703(e) from federal courts
across the country show the strength of Title VII’s protections. In Killinger
v. Samford University,103 for instance, a professor at Samford University’s
divinity school who taught undergraduate religion classes was dismissed
from his post in the divinity school because he did not share the same relig-
ious views as the divinity school dean, views the professor called “funda-
mentalist.”104 The professor sued Samford, alleging religious
discrimination.105 The university countered that Sections 702(a) and
703(e)(2) empowered it to take action against the professor on religious
grounds. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit concluded the
university was right—both sections allowed the university to make employ-
ment decisions on religious grounds as a means of preserving its religious
mission.106 In reaching this decision, the Eleventh Circuit recognized, “We,
as a federal court, must give disputes about what particulars should or
should not be taught in theology schools a wide-berth.”107
In Little v. Wuerl,108 a Catholic secondary school chose not to renew a
Protestant teacher’s contract because she had divorced her husband and re-
married outside of the “proper canonical process available from the Roman
Catholic Church.”109 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit dis-
missed the teacher’s lawsuit, which had alleged only religious discrimina-
tion, on summary judgment; the Court found the school was motivated by
its religious belief about resolving marital disputes within the Church.110
The school’s employment contract stated:
Teacher recognizes the religious nature of the Catholic School
and agrees that Employer has the right to dismiss a teacher for
serious public immorality, public scandal, or public rejection of
the official teachings, doctrine or laws of the Roman Catholic
Church, thereby terminating any and all rights that the Teacher
sex, or national origin”). This argument fails to take into account the limiting terms of Title VII’s
exemptions. Wilson supra note 15, at 446 n.291. Moreover, as noted below, courts have allowed
suits on protected grounds other than religion to proceed to trials on the merits.
103. 113 F.3d 196 (11th Cir. 1997).
104. Id. at 198.
105. Id.
106. Id.at 199–201.
107. Id. at 201.
108. 929 F.2d 945 (3rd Cir. 1991).
109. Id. at 946.
110. Id. at 951.
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may have hereunder, subject, however, to the personal due pro-
cess rights promulgated by the Roman Catholic Church.111
In applying Title VII’s religious exemptions, the Court found that “the per-
mission to employ persons ‘of a particular religion’ includes permission to
employ only persons whose beliefs and conduct are consistent with the em-
ployer’s religious precepts.”112 Although the legislative history of Section
703(e)(2) “never directly addresses the question of whether being ‘of a par-
ticular religion’ applies to conduct as well as formal affiliation,” an ex-
change with the exemption’s sponsor showed that Congress was “solicitous
of religious organizations’ desire to create communities faithful to their re-
ligious principles.”113
In Kennedy v. St. Joseph’s Ministries, Inc.,114 a nursing assistant, a
member of the Church of the Brethren, wore long dresses and skirts and a
cover for her hair, consistent with her faith.115 The hospital told the nursing
assistant her attire was inappropriate for a Catholic facility.116 After the
nursing assistant refused to change her attire, she was fired. 117 She alleged
she was retaliated against for violating the hospital’s dress code.118 The
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit interpreted Section 702(a)
broadly to reach all employment actions, barring the nursing assistant’s re-
taliation suit.119
As noted above, non-entanglement concerns also insulate from scru-
tiny employment decisions by religious schools. In Curray-Cramer v. Ursu-
line Acad. of Wilmington, Delaware, Inc.,120 the Court concluded “that if
we were to consider whether . . . opposing the war in Iraq is as serious a
challenge to Church doctrine as is promoting a woman’s right to abortion,
we would infringe upon the First Amendment Religion clauses.”121
Still, if an employer treats comparable employees differently after sub-
stantially similar conduct, “[r]equiring a religious employer to explain why
it has treated two employees who have committed essentially the same of-
fense differently poses no threat to the employer’s ability to create and
maintain communities of the faithful.”122 Hard questions have arisen about
the extent of these protections when a claim is brought on another protected
111. Id. at 945.
112. Id. at 951.
113. Id. at 950.
114. 657 F.3d 189 (4th Cir. 2011).
115. Id. at 190.
116. Id. at 191.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 192–95.
120. 450 F.3d 130 (3d Cir. 2006).
121. Id.
122. Id. at 141.
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ground, such as discrimination on the basis of sex.123 But the lesson of such
Title VII cases is clear: if a religious employer is alleged to take an adverse
action against an employee or prospective employee on a protected ground
other than religion (such as sex), and the employee makes a prima facie
case, the courts will not dispatch the claim on summary judgment even if
the employer defends on religious grounds.124 Instead, the dispute will go to
trial over whether the stated ground for the action, a religious tenet, was in
fact that actual ground for the action or was mere pretext for acting on an
illicit prohibited ground.
2. Title IX
A similar zone of autonomy for religious values appears in Title IX of
the Education Amendments of 1972. Title IX generally bans sex discrimi-
nation in any educational program or activity that receives federal financial
assistance but makes special allowance for the religious commitments of a
123. The heart of these questions buds from an interpretation of “sex,” and whether it includes
sexual orientation and gender identity (“SOGI”) discrimination. See generally Wilson, supra note
15; Robin Fretwell Wilson, The Nonsense About Bathrooms: How Purported Concerns Over
Safety Block LGBT Nondiscrimination Laws and Obscure Real Religious Liberty Concerns, 20
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1373 (2017) [hereinafter Nonsense]; Robin Fretwell Wilson & Bill Es-
kridge, Jr., Introduction, in RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, LGBT RIGHTS, AND THE PROSPECTS FOR COM-
MON GROUND (Bill Eskridge, Jr. & Robin Fretwell Wilson, eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 2018).
Since the Obama administration, the EEOC has interpreted sex discrimination to include SOGI
discrimination, relying on cases like Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989). See Sex-
Based Discrimination, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, https://www.eeoc.gov/laws/
types/sex.cfm (last visited Oct. 6, 2018). The EEOC was joined in this by the Department of
Justice (“DOJ”) under Attorney General Eric Holder. Eric Holder, Office of the Att’y Gen., Mem-
orandum of the Treatment of Transgender Employment Discrimination Claims Under Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Dec. 15, 2014), https://www.justice.gov/file/188671/download.
However, because the EEOC has no rulemaking authority; its interpretations receive only
weak deference known as Auer deference by courts for its interpretation of Title VII. Auer v.
Robbins, 519 U.S. 452 (1997). But the EEOC is not alone in adopting this interpretation—three
federal courts of appeal have come to the same conclusion. Franchina v. City of Providence, 881
F.3d 32 (1st Cir. 2018); Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc., 883 F.3d 100 (2d Cir. 2018); Hively v.
Ivy Tech Community College of Indiana, 853 F.3d 339 (7th Cir. 2017). The DOJ under Attorney
General Jeff Sessions has walked back this interpretation in a formal memorandum and in state
litigation (the EEOC has not changed its position). Jefferson Sessions, Office of the Att’y Gen.,
Memorandum on the Revised Treatment of Transgender Employment Discrimination Claims
Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Oct. 4, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/file/
1006981/download; Debra Cassens Weiss, Sessions Memo Says Title VII Doesn’t Bar Discrimina-
tion Against Transgender People, ABA JOURNAL (Oct. 6, 2017), http://www.abajournal.com/
news/article/sessions_memo_says_title_vii_doesnt_bar_discrimination_against_transgender;
Zarda, 883 F.3d 100. It is yet to be seen if Franchina, Zarda, Hively, or contrary cases like Evans
v. Georgia Regional Hospital, 850 F.3d 1248 (11th Cir. 2017), will spark the Supreme Court to
resolve the question. EEOC v. R.G. &. G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc., would present such an
opportunity as sixteen states have filed an amicus brief urging the Court to grant certiorari in the
case and arguing that Congress intended “sex” to mean a person’s biological status. 884 F.3d 560
(6th Cir. 2018) petition for cert. filed, No. 18-107 (U.S. July 20, 2018), https://www.supreme
court.gov/DocketPDF/18/18-107/60513/20180823153153598_Amicus%20Brief.pdf.
124. See generally Wilson, supra note 15.
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university.125 Under Title IX, religious institutions are categorically exempt
when the application of Title IX “would not be consistent with the religious
tenets of such organization.”126 In order to avail oneself of an exemption,
however, the Office of Civil Rights (“OCR”) has required schools to seek
and receive express waivers of Title IX provisions, identifying how specific
faith tenets influence their operations.127 During the Obama Administration,
OCR maintained a registry of institutions that have been granted waivers.128
Seeking exemption through the waiver process took on a greater ur-
gency for some religious colleges and universities after the Obama Admin-
istration interpreted Title IX’s ban on sex discrimination to include sexual
orientation and gender identity.129 Although the Department of Education
has never denied a requested waiver to a religious school,130 advocacy
groups sought the Department of Education’s waiver letters under the Free-
dom of Information Act and published them. Some saw this greater trans-
parency as exposing “hidden discrimination”; others as attempting to
“shame” religious organizations for their beliefs.131 The Trump Administra-
tion has back-walked this practice and the letters no longer prominently
appear on the Department of Education’s webpage.132
125. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (2012). Schools are deemed to have received federal financial assis-
tance when employee salaries are federally funded or when students use federal loans to pay for
tuition and expenses. Wilson, supra note 15, at 397–99.
126. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a)(3) (2012).
127. 34 C.F.R. § 106.12.31(b) (2018) (“An educational institution which wishes to claim the
exemption set forth in paragraph (a) of this section, shall do so by submitting in writing to the
Assistant Secretary a statement by the highest ranking official of the institution, identifying the
provisions of this part which conflict with a specific tenet of the religious organization.”). The
OCR provides guidance about Title IX’s religious exemptions and the procedure to obtain an
exemption. OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, Exemptions from Title IX, U.S. DEPT. OF EDUC. (last modi-
fied Nov. 21, 2018), https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/t9-rel-exempt/index.html.
That guidance, as maintained by the Trump Administration, however, states that an “institution’s
exempt status is not dependent upon its submission of a written statement to OCR,” and that
“[r]eligious institutions that have neither sought nor received prior written assurance from OCR
[through a written waiver] may still invoke their exemption after OCR receives a Title IX com-
plaint.” Id.
128. OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, Religious Exemptions Index, U.S. DEPT. OF EDUC. (last up-
dated Dec. 31, 2016), https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/t9-rel-exempt/z-index-links-
list-2009-2016.html.
129. OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, U.S. DEP’T OR EDUC., QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ON TITLE IX
AND SEXUAL VIOLENCE 5 (2014), http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/qa-201404-title-
ix.pdf.
130. Kif Augustine-Adams, Religious Exemptions to Title IX, 65 U. KAN. L. REV. 327, 330
(2016).
131. See generally Wilson, supra note 15.
132. Dear Colleague Letter from Sandra Battle, Acting Assistant Secretary for Civil Rights &
T.E. Wheeler, II, Acting Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights, Dear Colleague Letter (Feb.
22, 2017); Andrew Kreighbaum, Transgender Protections Withdrawn, INSIDE HIGHER EDUC.
(Feb. 23, 2017), https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2017/02/23/trump-administration-
reverses-title-ix-guidance-transgender-protections. The Trump administration has proposed scrap-
ping the letter requirement altogether, automatically granting religious schools waivers from Title
IX. See Tyler Kingkade, Betsy DeVos Wants to Make It Easier for Religious Schools to Avoid
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In waiver requests, some religious colleges have indicated that they
infuse their operations with religious values around sex in specific ways
across multiple domains—from admissions to housing to locker room facil-
ities—many of which the public might find surprising or problematic. Thus,
for example, a private Baptist College in Tennessee, Carson-Newman Uni-
versity, drew fire for requesting an exemption from Title IX “to the extent
application of those provisions would not be consistent with the [Southern
Baptists Convention’s] religious tenets regarding marriage, sex outside of
marriage, sexual orientation, gender identity, pregnancy and abortion.”133 It
identified specific conflicts as including Title IX’s general ban on admis-
sions policies that give differential treatment to the sexes and that prohibit
marital or parental status discrimination, as well as regulations governing
“recruitment,” “comparable facilities, such as restrooms,” and in “athletics”
and “housing.”134 Most salient here, Carson-Newman’s waiver request ex-
tended to maintaining “different rules of behavior or sanctions in education
program or activities,” as well as to having different criteria for recruiting,
doing pre-employment inquiries about hiring, and retaining persons of dif-
ferent sexes.135 It received that waiver.136 Asked to explain why it would
limit admissions for “gay students, unwed mothers, women [who have] had
an abortion and even students who may be pregnant,” Carson-Newman’s
president said, “[t]his is who we are.” 137
Title IX, BUZZFEED NEWS (Sept. 14, 2018), https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/tylerkingkade/
betsy-devos-religious-exemption-title-ix-discrimination. Tucked away on OCR’s website is a page
labeled “Other Correspondence” which archives letters from OCR to universities that requested a
religious waiver between 2017 and 2018, Other Correspondence, OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, U.S.
DEP’T OF EDUC., https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/correspondence/other.html (last modi-
fied Sept. 25, 2018), and another page titled “Religious Exemptions Index” that archives letters to
and from OCR regarding religious waiver requests prior to 2009, Religious Exemptions Index,
OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/
t9-rel-exempt/z-index-links-list-pre-2009.html (last modified Sept. 25, 2018).
133. Letter Regarding Claim of Title IX Religious Tenet Exemption from J. Randall O’Brien,
President of Carson-Newman Univ., to Catherine E. Lhaman, Assistant Sec’y for Civil Rights,
U.S. Dep’t of Educ. (May 1, 2015), https://www.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/t9-rel-exempt/
carson-newman-college-request-05012015.pdf.
134. Many of these requests became more focused during the Obama administration, which
treated gender identity as a prohibited ground for discrimination. For an extended discussion of
those protections and critique of claims that SOGI nondiscrimination protections are neither war-
ranted nor wise—including whether transgender persons as a group pose heightened safety risks
to others (they do not), see Nonsense, supra note 123.
135. O’Brien, supra note 133.
136. Letter Regarding Claim of Title IX Religious Tenet Exemption from Catherine E.
Lhaman, Assistant Secretary for Civil Rights, U.S. Dep’t of Educ., to J. Randall O’Brien, Presi-
dent of Carson-Newman University (July 10, 2015), https://ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/t9-
rel-exempt/carson-newman-response-07102015.pdf (waiving application of “[Title IX] to the ex-
tent that [it] prohibit[s] discrimination on the basis of marital status, sex outside of marriage,
sexual orientation, gender identity, pregnancy, or abortion and compliance would conflict with the
controlling organization’s religious tenets.”).
137. Lauren Davis, Carson-Newman University Granted Exemption from Discrimination
Laws, LOCAL 8 NEWS (Dec. 14, 2015, 9:39 PM), https://www.wvlt.tv/home/headlines/Carson-
Newman-University-granted-exemption-from-discrimination-laws-360521761.html. When con-
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As this example shows, practices that in the past remained outside the
public eye are now receiving unprecedented scrutiny, in part because Title
IX’s statutory guarantee was effected through a regulatory process subject
to open records laws. These practices have become murkier now that the
Department of Education no longer requires explicit waivers or makes uni-
versity request letters easily findable.138 But transparency is crucial to pro-
viding notice not only to faculty and staff at a given institution, but to
students, who may not fully understand the degree to which an institution of
higher education may be operating under sectarian and not secular norms.
As one of us has said elsewhere, notice is important to “reduc[e] unfair
surprise and hardship.”139
In short, Title VII’s and Title IX’s protections mean religious colleges
and universities may utilize religious commitments to shape the contours of
their academic community by appointing and retaining only professors who
share their faith commitments.140 That Congress has specifically granted
this latitude reflects Congress’s basic intuition at that time that religious
universities are special.141 It is against this strong network of institutional
religious liberty protections that the AAUP’s work “to advance academic
freedom and shared governance”142 at religious universities takes place.
V. THE AAUP’S TREATMENT OF RELIGIOUSLY AFFILIATED COLLEGES
AND UNIVERSITIES
Founded in 1915, the AAUP, a nonprofit membership association of
faculty and academic professionals with members at colleges and universi-
fronted with “concern[s] that the exemption technically allows the university to discriminate based
on sexual orientation, gender identity (including transgender status), sex outside of marriage, preg-
nancy and abortion,” Carson-Newman University President Dr. J Randall O’Brien stated:” It was
a template [that was also ‘given to several other universities that also filed for exemption’] that I
signed and we filed [after the school’s legal counsel said that ‘the exemption was something the
school needed to have on file to operate according to its religious principles’], but frankly I
thought it would probably go in a warehouse . . . and [would] probably never [be] seen or never be
used.” When asked “why the school needed the Title IX exemption, if it never had intentions of
discriminating,” Dr. O’Brien replied: “I don’t know. I guess some say in a complex world you just
never know what a future world might be like, what kind of bizarre hypotheticals. So it’s on file.”
Hailey Holloway, Carson-Newman University Gets Title IX Exemption, WATE 6 (Dec. 11, 2015,
4:56 PM), https://www.wate.com/news/local-news/carson-newman-university-gets-title-ix-exemp
tion_20170818090212587/793087640. See also Lonnie Wilkey & Chris Turner, Claiming Exemp-
tion Protects Colleges, BAPTIST AND REFLECTOR (Dec. 15, 2015), http://baptistandreflector.org/
claiming-exemption-protects-colleges/.
138. See supra notes 127 & 132.
139. Wilson, supra note 15, at 436.
140. Of course, state and local laws also operate to ban discrimination on the basis of illicit
characteristics and so may limit or erase the school’s ability to operate in a given manner in a
given jurisdiction. For discussion, see Wilson, supra note 15 (arguing that religious values should
not operate as rules of exclusion of LGBT persons).
141. See Christopher C. Lund, Religion is Special Enough, 103 VA. L. REV. 481 (2017).
142. Mission, AAUP, https://www.aaup.org/about/mission-1 (last visited Oct. 6, 2018).
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ties across the country,143 has taken on a central role in ensuring a free and
open academic debate that searches for truth in the marketplace of ideas.144
The AAUP endeavors to “shape American higher education by developing
the standards and procedures that maintain quality in education and aca-
demic freedom.”145 The organization stands against “people who want to
control what professors teach and write,” terming academic freedom a “fun-
damental principle” of the academy146 and an “indispensable requisite for
unfettered teaching and research in institutions of higher education.”147
It is difficult to understate the AAUP’s influence. The AAUP issues
guidelines and standards of academic freedom and calls out institutions that
fail to meet them. “While the [AAUP’s statements] technically ha[ve] no
legal force in [their] own right (though its extralegal authority is considera-
ble), [they] ha[ve] been adopted by most accrediting agencies, whose deter-
minations do have legal effect.”148 For example, in 2012, the AAUP issued
a joint statement on academic freedom with the Council for Higher Educa-
tion Accreditation, an institution that “represents some 3,000 colleges and
confers recognition on accrediting organizations.”149 In that statement, the
two bodies sketch the linkage between academic freedom and institutional
accreditation:
Attention necessarily turns to accreditation, which plays a pivotal
role in the public assurance of educational quality. To what extent
are accrediting organizations alert to the importance of academic
freedom? To what extent do their standards give adequate gui-
dance on the subject and capture the significance of institutional
decision making and the faculty’s role in that process? To what
extent are these standards realized in application, by periodic in-
spection and, particularly, on occasions when major controversies
erupt? Need more be done?150
143. About the AAUP, AAUP, https://www.aaup.org/about-aaup (last visited Oct. 6, 2018).
144. “Institutions of higher education are conducted for the common good and not to further
the interest of either the individual teacher or the institution as a whole. The common good de-
pends upon the free search for truth and its free exposition.” Protecting Academic Freedom,
AAUP, https://www.aaup.org/our-work/protecting-academic-freedom (last visited Oct. 6, 2018).
145. Mission, supra note 142.
146. History of the AAUP, AAUP, https://www.aaup.org/about/history-aaup (last visited Oct.
6, 2018).
147. Protecting Academic Freedom, supra note 144.
148. McConnell, supra note 50; see also The Database of Postsecondary Institutions and Pro-
grams, OFF. OF POSTSECONDARY EDUC., https://ope.ed.gov/dapip/ (last visited Oct. 6, 2018); Wil-
son, supra note 15, at 391 (“Private accrediting and certification bodies also exert significant
influence because their approval is often the difference between economic viability and closure.”).
149. Peter Schmidt, Accreditors Are Urged to Take New Steps to Protect Academic Freedom,
CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC. (Nov. 20, 2012), https://www.chronicle.com/article/Accreditors-Are-
Urged-to-Take/135886.
150. Accreditation and Academic Freedom, AAUP & CHEA (2012), https://www.chea.org/
userfiles/uploads/AAUP-CHEA%20-%20FINAL.pdf.
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The statement called on accreditors to “emphasize the principle of academic
freedom in the context of accreditation review, stressing its fundamental
meaning and essential value.”151
Government regulators often defer to accreditation bodies, deeming
their determinations sufficient for key decisions over grants, federal student
loan eligibility, and other governmental support of education.152 Scholarly
societies like the American Historical Association also take seriously
AAUP determinations, posting “open positions for history professors, [but]
flag[ging] censured universities for job-seekers—‘a kind of “asterisk” next
to the ad indicating that the institution is currently under censure.’”153
And beyond the strictly legal consequences of the AAUP’s influence,
AAUP censures of institutions weigh heavily on the censured institution’s
legitimacy. Faculty at the recently censured University of Nebraska-Lin-
coln, for example, feel “certain the AAUP’s action will affect the university
going forward.”154 A religion professor from the University of Illinois
called AAUP censure “a game-changer,” noting “[t]here is nothing more
powerful in the arsenal of those on campus who want to defend academic
freedom than AAUP censure.”155
Over the years, the AAUP had been concerned about scholars being
forced to mouth the opinions of religious colleges and universities that limit
academic freedom while simultaneously flying under the false colors of a
free academic university. Of central concern to the AAUP is the possibility
that a professor will think she enjoys academic freedom only to be fired or
disciplined when the professor’s scholarship breaks with the institution’s
orthodoxy. Throughout the evolution of the AAUP’s statements on the
place of academic freedom at religious universities and colleges are two
distinct threads: (1) the need to avoid unfair surprises to faculty members
by disclosing any limitations on academic freedom up front, ideally in the
employee’s written contract with the religious university, disclosures short-
handed as “limitation clauses,” and (2) that the enterprise that some relig-
151. Id.
152. The Department of Education “recognize[s] accreditation as the mechanism by which
institutional and programmatic legitimacy are ensured.” Accreditation and Quality Insurance,
U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ous/international/usnei/us/edlite-ac
creditation.html (last visited Oct. 6, 2018). The Department of Education has identified several
accreditation agencies whose approval “may be used by an institution accredited by the agency to
establish eligibility to participate in Title IV programs.” Accreditation in the United States, U.S.
DEP’T OF EDUC., https://www2.ed.gov/admins/finaid/accred/accreditation_pg6.html#NationallyRe
cognized (last modified Sept. 14, 2018).
153. Chris Dunker, AAUP Formally Censures UNL for Lecturer’s Dismissal, LINCOLN J. STAR
(June 16, 2018), https://journalstar.com/news/local/education/aaup-formally-censures-unl-for-lec
turer-s-dismissal/article_cfb88f92-6eff-5476-a426-a3acb50e606a.html (quoting Stephen Ramsay,
a professor of English at the University of Nebraska-Lincoln).
154. Id.
155. Id. (quoting Bruce Rosenstock).
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ious institutions of higher education are engaged in is simply not what real,
academically respectable universities are about.
Below, we track milestones in the evolution of the AAUP’s statements
on academic freedom at religious educational institutions and briefly sum-
marize academic debate about the AAUP’s positions. We do not intend to
rehearse others’ well fleshed-out positions. Instead, we sketch the compet-
ing views about the seriousness of religious universities’ academic enter-
prise and highlight the centrality of notice to faculty. Missing largely from
this account is notice to students as the primary consumer of the educations
provided at religious universities, which we believe must be present, too.156
A. AAUP Policy Statements
In 1915, the AAUP issued its Declaration of Principles on Academic
Freedom and Academic Tenure (“1915 Statement”). Although not relied
upon by the AAUP today, it labeled colleges and universities founded or
maintained by religious groups “proprietary institutions, in the moral
sense.”157 The 1915 Statement expressed no opinion on whether religious
universities should exist but sounded concerns about notice—presumably to
faculty and prospective and enrolled students:
[religious universities] do not, at least as regards one particular
subject, accept the principles of freedom of inquiry, of opinion,
and of teaching; and their purpose is not to advance knowledge by
the unrestricted research and unfettered discussion of impartial in-
vestigators, but rather to subsidize the promotion of opinions held
by the persons, usually not of the scholar’s calling, who provide
the funds for their maintenance. Concerning the desirability of the
existence of such institutions, the committee does not wish to ex-
press any opinion. But it is manifestly important that they should
not be permitted to sail under false colors.158
The 1915 Statement recognized there are many zones of inquiry that
do not lend themselves to scientific inquiry, although academic freedom is
valuable even as to these. “[P]hilosophy and religion” are one of three fields
of human inquiry where academic research has barely scratched the surface,
it said:159 “[W]e are still far from a comprehension of the final truths, and
from a universal agreement among all sincere and earnest men” as to mat-
ters of “the spirit life, and in the interpretation of the general meaning and
156. The public also has a stake in the rigor of the university’s work and teaching, particularly
if the university is an indirect recipient of federal and state student aid. Further, to the extent that a
university is a grantee or contractor with government or private foundations, these contractual
partners are impacted by the seriousness of the university’s academic enterprise.
157. 1915 Declaration of Principles on Academic Freedom and Academic Tenure, AAUP,
https://www.aaup.org/NR/rdonlyres/A6520A9D-0A9A-47B3-B550-C006B5B224E7/0/1915Decla
ration.pdf (last visited Oct. 20, 2018).
158. Id.
159. Id. (naming natural science and social science as the other two).
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ends of human existence and its relation to the universe.”160 That said, as to
all studies, “the breath in the nostrils of all scientific activity,” and “the first
condition of progress,” the 1915 Statement observed, is “complete and un-
limited freedom to pursue inquiry and publish its results.”161 In 1915, insti-
tutions desiring to maintain their religious character through faculty
scholarship were “becoming ever more rare,” the AAUP observed.162
In 1926, the AAUP adopted the Conference Statement on Academic
Freedom and Tenure (“1926 Statement”), an attempt by a number of orga-
nizations to articulate a shorter statement of principles on academic free-
dom and tenure.163 The 1926 Statement stressed notice to faculty members
at such universities: “A university or college may not impose any limitation
upon the teacher’s freedom in the exposition of his own subject in the class-
room . . . except . . . in the case of institutions of a denominational or
partisan character, specific stipulations in advance, fully understood and ac-
cepted by both parties, limit the scope and character of instruction.”164
Years later, in 1940, the AAUP restated these principles in a Statement
of Principles on Academic Freedom and Tenure (“1940 Statement”). On the
issue of the academic freedom of individual professors within religious edu-
cational institutions, the statement reads: “Limitations of academic freedom
because of religious or other aims of the institution should be clearly stated
in writing at the time of the appointment.”165 Some have interpreted this
statement to require the explicit inclusion of a “limitations clause” in a pro-
fessor’s contract.166
Several AAUP committees commented on the limitations clause in the
years following. One observed that “[a]t some point in the scale of self-
imposed restrictions a college or university that comes under them may, of
course, cease to be an institution of higher education according to the pre-
vailing conception.”167 Another observed that “[u]ndoubtedly under the
terms of the 1940 Statement of Principles some degree of limitation of aca-
demic freedom ‘because of religious or other aims of the institution’ is ad-
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id. The 1915 Statement continues: “We still have, indeed, colleges under denominational
auspices; but very few of them impose upon their trustees responsibility for the spread of specific
doctrines. They are more and more coming to occupy, with respect to the freedom enjoyed by the
members of their teaching bodies, the position of untrammeled institutions of learning, and are
differentiated only by the natural influence of their respective historic antecedents and traditions.”
Id.
163. Academic Freedom and Tenure, 32 BULL. AM. ASS’N U. PROFESSORS 149 (1946), https://
www.jstor.org/stable/40220666.
164. Id. at 150.
165. Id. at 152.
166. McConnell, supra note 50, at 306–07.
167. W.J. Kilgore, Report of the Special Committee on Academic Freedom in Church-Related
Colleges and Universities, 53 AAUP BULL. 369, 369 (1967) (quoting Committee A).
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missible.”168 A different committee, after a study of nearly two hundred
religious colleges and universities, concluded that “[a]ny limitation on aca-
demic freedom should be essential to the religious aims of the institution”
and that the faculty should be provided clear notice of any restrictions.169
In 1970, the AAUP put an interpretive gloss on the 1940 Statement,
adding footnotes that were adopted as AAUP policy (“1970 Statement”).
Footnoted to the 1940 Statement’s discussion of “limitations” is this text:
“Most church-related institutions no longer need or desire the departure
from the principle of academic freedom implied in the 1940 ‘Statement,’
and we do not endorse such a departure.”170 Five years after this addition,
the AAUP committee with oversight over the limitations clause described
the clause as an “anachronistic indulgence.” 171
By 1988, the AAUP tasked a subcommittee to make sense of how the
1940 and 1970 Statements fit together. The subcommittee ultimately con-
cluded that the 1970 Statement did not undo the 1940 limitations provision,
but that religious institutions must clearly and explicitly lay out the terms of
any limitation of academic freedom to their faculty, as permitted under the
1940 Statement.172 Not doing so, but continuing to censor scholarship,
would be to take advantage of an overly broad “indulgent limitation” unen-
dorsed by the AAUP, signaling an unauthentic institution of higher learn-
ing.173 Moreover, availing itself of limitations clauses says something about
the university’s seriousness, the subcommittee noted: limitations clauses
168. Advisory Letters from the Washington Office, 51 AAUP BULL. 71, 72 (1965).
169. Kilgore, supra note 167.
170. See Graham, supra note 9 (noting that many find the desire of religious institutions to
inscribe a faith-driven ethos on the institution to be a source of “bafflement and mockery”). For
some, the fact that a dwindling number of institutions would use a limitations clause “argues for,
not against, their accommodation. When the vast majority of academic institutions are committed
to the view of knowledge reflected in the principle of secular academic freedom, there is little to
be gained and much to be lost from quelling the few dissenting institutional voices. As religious
institutions, such schools are more valuable as exemplars of an alternative understanding of
knowledge than they could ever be as (in many cases, unexceptional) secular colleges.” McCon-
nell, supra note 50, at 303.
171. Report of Committee A, 1974–75, 61 AAUP BULL. 104, 105 (1975).
172. Finkin et al., supra note 19, at 54–55.
173. Id. Under this view, absent an express limitation of academic freedom in the faculty
member’s contract, there is a presumption of unfettered academic freedom, even at religious uni-
versities. Professors Douglas Laycock and Susan E. Waelbroeck would reverse this presumption,
in part because of the connection between academic freedom and government regulation of relig-
ious universities:
Of course the Church could enter into an enforceable contract waiving its right to con-
trol its theologians. But it is unlikely to do so, and our general reluctance to find an
implied waiver of constitutional rights requires that any such agreements be explicit and
deliberate. Any government attempt to impose academic freedom on a religious univer-
sity without its knowing and authorized consent would directly clash with the first
amendment.
Douglas Laycock & Susan E. Waelbroeck, Academic Freedom and the Free Exercise of Religion,
66 TEX. L. REV. 1455, 1455–56 (1988) (discussing the impropriety of government imposition of
academic freedom).
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signal that the institution is not authentically a part of the higher education
community.174 Some remarked at the time that this stance placed religious
universities in an untenable position: comply with the 1940 Statement by
expressly limiting the academic freedom of the university’s faculty and be
derided by the AAUP as not serious or ignore the 1940 Statement, give no
notice of such limitations of academic freedom, and face formal AAUP
censure.175
Both scenarios foreground concerns about flying under false colors. In
the first, the faculty has notice but the public does not; in the second,
neither has notice, except what attention AAUP censure is likely to garner
(which may be considerable in the immediate aftermath of censure).
Ultimately, the subcommittee’s interpretation was not adopted by the
governing committee of the AAUP:
The committee declined to accept the subcommittee’s invitation
to hold that the invocation of the clause exempts an institution
from the universe of higher education, in part due to the belief
that it is not appropriate for the Association to decide what is and
what is not an authentic institution in higher education. The com-
mittee did conclude, however, that invocation of the clause does
not relieve an institution of its obligation to afford academic free-
dom as called for in the 1940 Statement.176
Presumably, the AAUP thought this statement would put the issue to
rest. But the next year, the AAUP stated that a majority of the governing
committee considered “the last sentence to be no more than a truism that
begs the question of what obligation a church-related institution has to af-
ford academic freedom. That question will apparently continue to vex
us.”177
In 1997, perhaps to clear up lingering confusion, the subcommittee
again convened to provide guidelines for how, procedurally, the AAUP
should respond after receiving a complaint about infringements on aca-
demic freedom at a religious college or university. Its report recommended
the AAUP (1) determine whether the institution is one whose adherence to
the 1940 Statement is expected, (2) if expected, an investigation should
commence to determine whether the religious limitation on academic free-
dom was explicit and accepted by the faculty member and/or whether the
174. Finkin et al., supra note 19, at 58.
175. Id. at 58–59 (comment of William W. Van Alstyne). Professor Laycock also worries that
this stance places religious institutions between a rock and a hard place, labelling them as in-
authentic members of the academic community regardless of their compliance with the 1940
Statement’s limitations; this in turn “would create a powerful disincentive to disclosure.” DOUG-
LAS LAYCOCK, RELIGIOUS LIBERTY, VOLUME 2: THE FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE 519–24 (2011). Fur-
ther, “[t]his interpretation would convert an accommodation for religious schools into a hidden
trap designed to drum such schools out of the academic community.” Id.
176. Matthew W. Finkin, Report of Committee A 1988–89, 75 ACADEME 49, 54 (1989).
177. Id.
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actions of the faculty member fall outside the purview of that limitation,
and (3) deliver the investigation to an AAUP committee which would de-
cide whether to censure the institution.178 This recommendation would
seem to reaffirm the ability of religious institutions to avail themselves of
limitation clauses without fear of AAUP censure. The following year the
AAUP again observed: “The meaning and scope of [the limitations] clause
have been a perennial challenge.”179
Since 1972, the AAUP has formulated Recommended Institutional
Regulations on Academic Freedom and Tenure. These proposed regulations
for universities “are designed to enable [a university] to protect academic
freedom and tenure and to ensure academic due process.”180 The most re-
cent iteration of these proposed regulations, set forth in 2018 (“2018 State-
ment”), draws upon the AAUP’s 1940 Statement, its 1958 “Statement on
Procedural Standards in Faculty Dismissal Proceedings,” the AAUP’s “con-
tinuing experience in evaluating regulations actually in force at particular
institutions,” and “the standards and procedures of the [AAUP] over the
years.”181 The 2018 Statement recommends universities adopt the following
provision concerning academic freedom: “All members of the faculty,
whether tenured or not, are entitled to academic freedom as set forth in the
1940 Statement of Principles on Academic Freedom and Tenure . . . .”182
The 2018 Statement says nothing explicitly about academic freedom limita-
tions by religious institutions.183 Taken at face value, one might assume the
2018 Statement incorporates by reference the limitations clause device ref-
erenced in the 1940 Statement. But the fact that the 2018 Statement does
not specifically address the “perennial challenge” of the limitations clause
would seem to be a harbinger of change—that institutions limiting aca-
demic freedom of their faculty would be subject to censure even when such
limitations are disclosed in writing at the time of appointment. In the end, it
is hard to predict just what the AAUP’s operating principle is against the
backdrop of the AAUP’s debate about the limitation clause and the multiple
layers of resulting policy statements.
178. Matthew W. Finkin et al., The “Limitations” Clause in the 1940 Statement of Principles:
Some Operating Guidelines, 83 ACADEME 49 (1997).
179. Robert M. O’Neil, Report of Committee A, 83 ACADEME 75, 78 (1997), http://
www.jstor.org/stable/40251591. Critics are less kind. Professor Laycock believes the AAUP has
made a “great muddle . . . of its academic freedom rules. . . . [T]he AAUP rules are a mess.”
Douglas Laycock, Academic Freedom, Religious Commitment, and Religious Integrity, 78 MARQ.
L. REV. 297, 302 (1995).
180. Recommended Institutional Regulations on Academic Freedom and Tenure, AAUP,
https://www.aaup.org/report/recommended-institutional-regulations-academic-freedom-and-ten
ure (last visited Nov. 26, 2018).
181. Id.; accord Statement on Procedural Standards in Faculty Dismissal Proceedings,
AAUP, https://www.aaup.org/report/statement-procedural-standards-faculty-dismissal-proceed
ings (last visited Nov. 26, 2018).
182. Recommended Institutional Regulations on Academic Freedom and Tenure, supra note
180.
183. See id.
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B. Religious Freedom of Religious Universities: Threat or Strength?
The single through line in the AAUP’s treatment of academic freedom
has been notice to faculty. At a minimum, notice to faculty serves the goods
of avoiding harm to a faculty member who wants to pursue serious scholar-
ship and may be holding multiple offers, both at institutions that will pro-
vide the necessary space for that work and at institutions that will not.
How one feels about the larger good of religious institutions following
religious norms in educating students, rather than secular ones, may rest on
the value one places on religious institutions generally or religious freedom
itself. Scholars, like Professor Jessie Hill, note that “religious institutions
play a unique and valuable role in society. They serve as counterpoints to
the state, offering competing norms and values, and as such, they play an
important role in supporting a pluralistic and robust civil society.”184 Pro-
fessor McConnell echoes: “Even if the accommodation of religious ap-
proaches to knowledge were not valuable to the advancement of knowledge
itself, a modification of academic freedom principles would nonetheless be
justified because of its importance to religious freedom.”185 Those in the
community of religious educators urge that religious commitments should
receive equal respect with secular ones—“just as society leaves room for
secular commitments in the pursuit of knowledge and preparation of the
next generation to lead full, impactful lives, it must leave room for religious
ones, as well.”186
Professor Matthew Finkin, who served on the AAUP subcommittee
discussed above, stresses the potential abuses by religious institutions flying
under false colors, much as the AAUP did in its 1915 Statement:187
An [religious] institution so dedicated, as an agency of dogma and
doctrine, may test the limit of societal tolerance, but the freedom
to be an unfree place, to be a place where no utterance contrary to
some officially established truth may be heard on the institution’s
property—even on its public paths and parking lots—cannot be
invoked under the head of “academic freedom” without working a
debasement of meaning.188
Professor Finkin’s challenge goes beyond the classic point of whether
toleration can make room for intolerance to probe whether such institutions,
as unfree places, properly may be called universities. Like Professor Finkin,
we worry that students standing on the cusps of their futures may not fully
184. B. Jesse Hill, God and Man and Religious Exemptions in the Modern University, in
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, LGBT RIGHTS, AND THE PROSPECTS FOR COMMON GROUND (Bill Eskridge,
Jr & Robin Fretwell Wilson eds., 2018).
185. McConnell, supra note 50, at 304.
186. Hoogstra, LoMaglio & Crofford, supra note 2.
187. See supra note 157.
188. Matthew W. Finkin, On Institutional Academic Freedom, 61 TEX. L. REV. 817, 839–40
(1983).
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understand the consequences of attending a university that limits the aca-
demic freedom of its faculty. As the next subpart illustrates, the AAUP has
censured religious universities both for environments anathema to free in-
quiry as to all matters, as well as universities that have policed faculty in
their articulation of narrow theological claims at the core of the faith tradi-
tion of the university.
C. AAUP Censure
Clues as to the AAUP’s current position towards the 1940 Statement’s
limitations clause can be found in the various investigations the AAUP con-
ducts at religious colleges and universities it feels has violated its standards
of academic freedom. When the AAUP investigates an institution, AAUP
members speak with its leaders, the parties to the particular conflict, stu-
dents, and faculty members, which may surface other complaints.189 Many
of these investigations result in a formal censure of the educational institu-
tion, accompanied by an in-depth, published report. Currently, fifty-six col-
leges and universities sit on the AAUP’s censure list.190 Of these, at least
twenty, roughly 36 percent, have religious ties.191
A pair of cases resulting in censure highlight the risks of honoring, and
not honoring, limitations on academic freedom. Consider one currently cen-
sured university, Southeastern Baptist Theological Seminary (“Southeast-
ern”) in Wake Forest, North Carolina. In 1989, the AAUP found that
“academic freedom at Southeastern has been placed in peril.”192 In its re-
port, the AAUP concluded that a newly-installed board of trustees and pres-
ident of Southeastern interfered with faculty appointments. The degree to
which they interfered signaled that “doctrinal correctness, narrowly mea-
sured, is of far greater significance than openness of mind” at Southeast-
ern.193 To the extent that religiously-minded officials superintended content
189. What is Censure?, AAUP, https://www.aaup.org/issues/academic-freedom/whatiscensure
(last visited Sept. 29, 2018). Of course, not all universities cooperate with such investigations. For
instance, Loma Linda University, when faced with an AAUP investigation, rebuffed the entire
process. The university president chided the AAUP, stating that “The individuals who invited you
here also obviously neglected to tell you that membership in a union like the AAUP violates the
tenets of the Seventh-day Adventist Church which sponsors Loma Linda University and to which
these individuals claim to belong. . . . Your organization is not welcome on university premises.
University facilities are not open for the use of your committee.” Loma Linda University (Califor-
nia), 78 ACADEME 42, (1992), https://www.aaup.org/file/Loma-Linda-University.pdf. The AAUP
proceeded to meet individuals at off-campus locations, and eventually reprimanded the university
for the dismissal of three of its professors. Id.
190. Censure List, AAUP, https://www.aaup.org/our-programs/academic-freedom/censure-list
(last visited Sept. 29, 2018).
191. Id. Religious colleges and universities in the U.S. are over-represented on the AAUP’s
censure list when compared to the fraction of all universities and colleges in the U.S. that have
religious ties. See supra notes 1 & 2.
192. Academic Freedom and Tenure: Southeastern Baptist Theological Seminary (North Car-
olina), 75 ACADEME 35, 44 (1989).
193. Id. at 44.
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in courses running the gamut of the curriculum—or that the influence ex-
erted on appointments seeped into how Southeastern faculty conducted their
classes—students enrolling in Southeastern may be at risk for receiving ed-
ucations that are deficient in basic preparation on subjects like math, sci-
ence, and English. If this is so, basic fairness would demand that
Southeastern’s students should be put on notice.
Contrast this with the 1997 kerfuffle which landed Brigham Young
University (“BYU”), a wholly owned subsidiary of The Church of Jesus
Christ of Latter-day Saints (the “Church”), on the AAUP’s censured list.
The AAUP censured BYU for its treatment of a professor who “advocated
praying to a Mother in Heaven” in class, in her scholarship, and at public
events.194 BYU claimed that praying to a Heavenly Mother, instead of a
Heavenly Father, contradicted fundamental church doctrine.195 In its Aca-
demic Freedom Policy, the university outlined limitations, which included:
when the faculty behavior or expression seriously and adversely
affects the University mission or the Church. Examples would in-
clude expression with students or in public that: 1. contradicts or
opposes, rather than analyzes or discusses, fundamental Church
doctrine or policy; 2. deliberately attacks or derides the Church or
its general leaders; or 3. violates the Honor Code because the ex-
pression is dishonest, illegal, unchaste, profane, or unduly disre-
spectful of others . . . .196
After an investigation, the AAUP concluded that “infringements on
academic freedom [at BYU] are distressingly common and that the climate
for academic freedom is distressingly poor.”197 In response to the censure
report, BYU officials observed:
If a religious university cannot limit a professor from publicly
endorsing prayer to a God other than the God to whom we are
commanded to pray, then it cannot limit anything, and the “limi-
tations” clause of the 1940 Statement is an outright deception.
The “limitations” clause was designed to respect the mission and
institutional academic freedom of religious colleges and universi-
ties. It is regrettable that the AAUP has elected not to follow the
1940 Statement, which honors that religious freedom.
Despite the university’s use of contractual provisions notifying faculty of
the university’s limitations on academic freedom, BYU’s censure stuck.
If encroachments extended beyond the administration’s reprimand of
the one faculty member on this one article of faith, this case would be more
like the climate the AAUP charged prevailed at Southeastern. But let us
posit that BYU limited the area in which it effectively overruled faculty
194. Academic Freedom and Tenure: Brigham Young University, 75 ACADEME 52 (1997).
195. Id. at 59.
196. Id. at 55.
197. Id. at 68.
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members’ views to matters of deep theological import—such as whether a
Heavenly Mother exists in addition to a Heavenly Father or whether a fol-
lower of the Church should pray to a Heavenly Mother. In this instance, we
would have far less grave concerns about notice to students who may
choose to attend BYU since they surely believe that they are at BYU to,
among other things, be versed in and absorb the Church’s theology. One
can hardly imagine a person at BYU not understanding that since:
New faculty are interviewed by Church General Authorities as a
condition of employment, and Church members are subsequently
expected, as part of their university citizenship, to “live lives of
loyalty to the restored gospel.” Faculty of other faiths agree to
respect the LDS nature of the University and its mission, while
the University in turn respects their religious convictions.198
Indeed, many BYU students, who are required to attend church meet-
ings,199 and their parents, consciously select BYU as their preparatory
grounds in order to be versed in the faith, which they will carry into the
world. This fact tees up the question: how should one think of academic
freedom of faculty in relation to the university’s mission of preparing stu-
dents for lives in a specific faith tradition?
VI. NAVIGATING COLLISIONS BETWEEN INSTITUTIONAL RELIGIOUS
LIBERTY AND INDIVIDUAL ACADEMIC FREEDOM
In the struggle between religious freedom of religious universities and
honoring the academic freedom of individual faculty, the guardrails placed
around university discretion by Title VII strikes us as sensible. Religious
universities have dual missions: first, to shape students in their religious
commitments, and second, to provide solid liberal arts and general educa-
tions. To achieve the first, religious universities must hold a veto power on
theological claims made by individual faculty. But to achieve the second—
providing a solid education—the religious university should no more quash,
shape, or influence a faculty member’s research on subjects or topics that
are non-theological than any other university should do so.
We recognize that borrowing this approach from Title VII will mean,
like Title VII itself, that one has to draw lines around what counts as a
theological dispute and what does not. Under the heading of non-theologi-
cal claims—for which the faculty member necessarily has academic free-
dom—we would place scientific claims and matters that are empirically
falsifiable. On the side of theological disputes, we would place claims as to
the nature of God and the existence of after-life as easy examples. Ques-
198. Academic Freedom, BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIV. 1, 3, https://policy.byu.edu/view/index.php?
p=9 (last visited Sept. 29, 2018).
199. Church Educational System Honor Code, BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIV. 1, 6, https://policy.byu
.edu/view/index.php?p=26 (last visited Sept. 29, 2018).
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tions like intelligent design sit at the margin of the theological and non-
theological but are not today amenable to falsification.200
What would this mean at a school like Southeastern? If Southeastern
directed its faculty to teach students that the earth is flat (it is not, despite a
not-insignificant fraction of Millennials holding this belief)201—and a
faculty member balked—we believe the faculty member should prevail. But
if Southeastern directed faculty members to instruct students that God is a
triune deity or that Jesus is the only way to salvation, we believe the faculty
member would have to yield to the university’s view in order for the uni-
versity to carry out its mission to prepare students in their faith tradition.
Of course, like the Title IX blanket waiver letters discussed above,
universities may seek to cloak every dispute in a theological framework.
For example, one can imagine a female professor studying whether women
have similar leadership styles to men or whether women’s leadership styles
allow them to excel at specific tasks like piloting choppers safely202—and a
fundamentalist university countering that women should not be the head of
the man.203 Under a framework that divides questions into theological and
non-theological ones—and commits the theological to the university to de-
cide and control—if the professor makes the claim in a theology class, she
would not have the academic freedom to do so. But if the professor makes
the claim in a physiology class, she would, since students are there to learn
how specific biological structures affect the functioning of the human body,
200. See, e.g., Kent Greenawalt, Intelligent Design: Scientific Theory or Religious Convic-
tion?, 45 J. CHURCH & ST. 237 (2003) (“unpack[ing] the claims of intelligent design, analyzing to
what extent they may belong in science courses, and the degree to which they represent religious
assertion”). A continuum exists between being non-falsifiable and falsifiable; as knowledge on a
subject accretes or new methods of inquiry give us a glimpse of the universe we previously did not
have, a claim may become falsifiable. Thus, things now seen as scientifically certain were theo-
logical questions in the past. Consider the Ptolemaic view of the universe—that the sun revolves
around the Earth. The Ptolemaic Model, IOWA STATE UNIV., http://www.polaris.iastate.edu/Even
ingStar/Unit2/unit2_sub1.htm (last visited Oct. 6, 2018); Alexander Raymond Jones, Ptolemaic
System, ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/science/Ptolemaic-system (last
visited Oct. 6, 2018). For hundreds of years, the Catholic Church followed this belief. Today, we
would call that a falsifiable view. But 385 years ago, holding the view that the Earth revolved
around the sun put Galileo, a teacher at the University of Padua, at odds with the Catholic Church.
The Church detained Galileo on house arrest for nine years until he died. And even after Galileo’s
death, the Church persecuted those who advanced Galileo’s theory, a theory that now has been
accepted as a scientific fact for 250 years. Only in 1992 did the Catholic Church acknowledge the
validity of Galileo’s work. Alan Cowell, After 350 Years, Vatican Says Galileo Was Right: It
Moves, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 31, 1992), https://www.nytimes.com/1992/10/31/world/after-350-years-
vatican-says-galileo-was-right-it-moves.html.
201. Two-thirds of Millennials in a recent survey indicated the earth is round. The remainder
were skeptical, unsure, or believe it is flat. Trevor Nance, Only Two-Thirds of American Millenni-
als Believe the Earth Is Round, FORBES (Apr. 4, 2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/trevornace/
2018/04/04/only-two-thirds-of-american-millennials-believe-the-earth-is-round/#7220bc617ec6.
202. Mark Thompson, Army Women: Better Chopper Pilots Than the Guys?, TIME (Feb. 17,
2014), http://time.com/8404/army-women-helicopter-pilots/.
203. 1 Timothy 2:12; 1 Corinthians 11:3.
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not what the Apostle Paul said about the relationship between Christ and
men, or between men and women.
Parsing in this way brings considerably more of the work of individual
faculty at religious universities under the umbrella of academic freedom
than does a limitations clause approach. Under the limitations clause ap-
proach, religious universities are incentivized to insert broad contractual
provisions in their contracts with faculty members, permitting the university
to superintend everything being taught. These contracts act as adhesion con-
tracts since faculty seeking coveted teaching positions lack equal bargaining
strength. Broad limitations clauses presumably satisfied the 1940 State-
ment, although the actual censure decision described in BYU’s case may
call this into question.
Consider a second hard case, adapted from Hall v. Baptist Mem’l
Health Care Corp.204 In Hall, an employee claimed she had been fired by
the Baptist nursing college where she worked after she told the college she
ministered at a church that welcomed gay and lesbian people like herself.205
She alleged only religious discrimination.206 The college defended on the
doctrinal ground that homosexuality was a “perversion of divine stan-
dards.”207 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit found the college
qualified as a religious institution under Section 702(a), entitling it to sum-
mary judgment.208
Imagine that Hall taught at Southeastern and further imagine two sce-
narios: first that Hall teaches students that some persons have sexual desires
for persons of the same sex and second that Hall instructs her students that
God makes no mistakes so that LGBT persons could not be a “perversion of
divine standards.”209 Under a framework dividing theological claims and
non-theological ones, Hall would prevail in a clash over the first teaching,
on academic freedom grounds, because the claim she made—that some per-
sons have sexual desires for persons of the same sex—is a factually falsifi-
able claim. Plainly, whether the AAUP or other forces external to the
university believe that she should have academic freedom may not in fact
insulate the faculty member from repercussions, but any firing or discipline
of the faculty member for this teaching would subject the school to censure.
On the second teaching, however, the faculty member makes a theological
claim; for this, she would not enjoy academic freedom under this approach.
204. 215 F.3d 618 (6th Cir. 2000).
205. Id. at 622–23.
206. Id. at 621.
207. Id. at 622.
208. Id. at 624.
209. See Jennifer C. Pizer, It’s Not About the Cake: Against “Altaring” the Public Market-
place, in RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, LGBT RIGHTS, AND THE PROSPECTS FOR COMMON GROUND (Wil-
liam N. Eskridge, Jr. & Robin Fretwell Wilson eds., 2018).
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As before, note that the limitations clause approach would place both
clashes over what the faculty member can teach without fear on the same
plane, leaving her subject to sanction by the university for both claims if the
university so limited its employment contracts—while giving students no
notice of that fact.
In all of these line-drawing cases, pretext may operate, just as it does
with Title VII, where discrimination on a protected ground other than relig-
ion may actually motivate a dismissal or sanction of the faculty member,
not the theological claim being made. It is important not to conflate the two.
Under the framework we propose, factual questions will arise and fact-find-
ers will have to divine the real motivation for an adverse employment deci-
sion. Consider as an example AAUP’s censure of Albertus Magnus
College,210 a Roman Catholic college, which dismissed a gay professor for
his views on abstinence. In the preface to one of his books, the professor
expressed concerns about “the manner in which the moral ideal of sexual
abstinence outside of marriage is used [to] deprive individuals of resources
essential to their personal and spiritual well-being” and that he was con-
vinced “that the continuance of traditional Christian sexual moral rules . . .
is causing significant harm.”211 The school fired him and the professor sued
for sex discrimination; he won—the professor’s sexual orientation as a gay
man figured in the college’s decision-making.212
Importantly, one’s view of academic freedom’s value at religious uni-
versities may be impacted by one’s archetypal view of academic freedom.
For many people, the mental map of academic freedom assumes a regres-
sive institution firing an enlightened individual faculty member, who but for
the firing would open vistas for students trapped at the regressive institu-
tion. This regressive-institution-enlightened-faculty-member-configuration
is not always the fact pattern presented.
Imagine that the faculty member claiming academic freedom is the
conservative force, circulating views that do not fit the progressive tenor of
the university environment. Something like this occurred at University of
Toledo, where a human resources director, who was not entitled to aca-
demic freedom, wrote an op-ed in the local paper in response to the Editor-
in-Chief’s previous op-ed on gay rights, saying:
As a Black woman . . . I take great umbrage at the notion that
those choosing the homosexual lifestyle are “civil rights victims.”
Here’s why. I cannot wake up tomorrow and not be a Black wo-
210. Academic Freedom and Tenure: Albertus Magnus College (Connecticut), 86 ACADEME
54 (2000).
211. MICHAEL J. HARTWIG, THE POETICS OF INTIMACY AND THE PROBLEM OF SEXUAL ABSTI-
NENCE 4 (2000).
212. Hartwig v. Albertus Magnus Coll., 93 F. Supp. 2d 200 (D. Conn. 2000).
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man. I am genetically and biologically a Black woman and very
pleased to be so as my Creator intended.213
The university president put the director on administrative leave three days
after the statement.214 He, too, then authored an op-ed in the paper, distanc-
ing himself from the director’s statement; he made clear the director’s posi-
tion did not “accord with the values of the University of Toledo.”215 Now,
as director of human resources, this employee was tasked with enforcing
EEOC guidelines, state laws, and university policies about hiring fairly, in-
cluding not discriminating based on sexual orientation. The human re-
sources director sued the university, alleging she had been retaliated against
for the exercise of her free speech rights under the First Amendment and
was not guaranteed equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment like
her colleagues because she expressed a less favored viewpoint grounded in
her Christian faith.216 Neither claim succeeded.217
However, if this same statement had been made by a faculty member
who held no administrative position, it makes a theological claim about
what God intends and does not intend in terms of human sexuality. As a
theological claim, it would merit no academic freedom if made at a relig-
ious university that took a contrary view under the approach we have been
describing.
In many ways, the line we draw here is no different than when secular
institutions self-define by commitments to inclusion. So, for example,
Oberlin College took action against one of its professors for anti-Semitic
and anti-Israel statements made outside the university on the professor’s
personal Facebook page.218 One of the professor’s posts attacked Israel as a
Zionists state.219 Another stated:
It’s troubling that in this day and age, where there is all this ac-
cess to information, most of the general public doesn’t know who
and what ISIS really is. I promise you, ISIS is not a jihadist, Is-
lamic terrorist organization. It’s a CIA and Mossad operation, and
there’s too much information out there for the general public not
to know this.220
213. Dixon v. Univ. of Toledo, 702 F.3d 269, 271–72 (6th Cir. 2012).
214. Id. at 272.
215. Id.
216. Id. at 274, 277–78.
217. Id. at 277, 279.
218. Colleen Flaherty, Oberlin Ousts Professor, INSIDE HIGHER EDUC. (Nov. 16, 2016), https:/
/www.insidehighered.com/news/2016/11/16/oberlin-fires-joy-karega-following-investigation-her-
anti-semitic-statements-social; see also Colleen Flaherty, Unacademic Freedom?, INSIDE HIGHER
EDUC. (Mar. 2, 2016), https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2016/03/01/does-academic-freedom-
protect-falsehoods.
219. David Gerstman, Oberlin Professor Claims Israel Was Behind 9/11, ISIS, Charlie Hebdo
Attack, THE TOWER (Feb. 25, 2016), http://www.thetower.org/3012-oberlin-professor-claims-
israel-was-behind-911-isis-charlie-hebdo-attack/.
220. Id.
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Altogether, the mass of the professor’s statements were too much for the
college to take and they terminated her employment. 221 In today’s techno-
logical age, the distinction between in-the-classroom and out-of-classroom
conduct has arguably evaporated; still, we acknowledge that communica-
tions outside the classroom may merit greater insulation from the univer-
sity’s reach.222 But a Facebook post or tweet is likely more accessible to
students and ultimately more divisive in the community at large than any-
thing said in a classroom. For Oberlin College, the faculty member’s aca-
demic freedom was beside the point. The college argued that her statements
were not protected because they were not “part of her scholarship and ‘had
irreparably impaired [her] ability to perform her duties as a scholar, a
teacher and a member of the community.’”223 Further, academic freedom
does not insulate views that have no basis in fact or are identifiably false.224
But like religious colleges themselves, Oberlin’s specific commitments as
an institution made it impossible to have in its midst dissent on so funda-
mental a point—here, arguably the notion that distinctions should not be
made on the basis of religion or that an identifiable group of people should
not be maligned.225
221. Flaherty, Oberlin Ousts Professor, supra note 218.
222. See Mara Rose Williams, Free to Speak Freely; Colleges Protecting Faculty Speech On
Campus and Off, KAN. CITY STAR (June 15, 2018), https://www.kansascity.com/news/local/
article212807554.html.
223. Flaherty, Oberlin Ousts Professor, supra note 218.
224. Flaherty, Unacademic Freedom?, supra note 218 (“Karega makes declarations that most
educated people, let alone people with doctorates and regardless of their positions on Israel, would
reject as unsupported by fact.”).
225. More recently, academic heavy-hitters and their universities have come under fire for
academic views on politically and socially touchy issues like LGBT rights. At Johns Hopkins
University, an emeritus faculty member, who has been called “the most important American psy-
chiatrist of the last half-century,” published a 143-page article together with a visiting statistician
in The New Atlantis that argued there is no provable scientific basis for being transgender and that
being gay is a choice. Lawrence S. Mayer & Paul R. McHugh, Sexuality and Gender: Findings
from the Biological, Psychological, and Social Sciences, 50 NEW ATLANTIS 1, 4 (Adam Keiper
ed., 2016) (citing the Editor’s Note). Critics quickly gathered to deride his argument as junk
science. Brynn Tannehill, Debunking the New Atlantis Article on Sexuality and Gender, HUFFPOST
(Mar. 24, 2017), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/debunking-the-new-atlantis-article_us_58
d5242ee4b0f633072b36a4; Press Releases: McHugh Exposed: HRC launches Website Debunking
the Junk Science of Paul McHugh, HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN (Apr. 21, 2017), https://
www.hrc.org/press/mchugh-exposed-hrc-launches-website-debunking-the-junk-science-of-paul-
mchu; Peter LaBarbera, LGBT Activists Slam ‘the Most Important Psychiatrist of the Last Half-
Century’ Because He Debunks Transgender Ideology, LIFESITE (May 15, 2017),  https://
www.lifesitenews.com/news/lgbt-activists-slam-the-most-important-psychiatrist-of-the-last-half-
centur. Whatever the merits of the professor’s briefing of the scientific literature, the professors’
paper acted as a lightning rod, drawing criticism from LGBT activist groups such as the Human
Rights Campaign, which urged John Hopkins to disavow the work.  Johns Hopkins refused to do
so and in response, the Human Rights Campaign downgraded the university on its 2017 Health-
care Equality Index. Why Johns Hopkins Hospital Received the 25 Point Deduction in the HEI,
HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN, http://www.hrc.org/resources/johns-hopkins (last visited Oct. 6,
2018); Healthcare Equality Index 2017, HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN (2017), https://assets2.hrc.org/
files/assets/resources/HEI-2017.pdf?_ga=2.180874855.1584542250.1531411435-833632595.1
530561798&_gac=1.140832006.1531412041.EAIaIQobChMIidqXs_qZ3AIVh1x-Ch1TlguqEAA
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Consider the degree of offense that would be given, if a faculty mem-
ber, writing in their areas of scholarship inside religious school, could make
claims that go to the very core of the community’s identity. Imagine that
David Irving, an author who denies the Holocaust,226 obtained tenure at
Yeshiva University, “the world’s premier Jewish institution for higher edu-
cation.”227 Many professors wait to wade into the more controversial ele-
ments of their disciplines until they have achieved the professional security
of tenure, so imagine further that Irving’s views on the Holocaust do not
surface until he achieves tenure. Under our approach, if Irving asserted that
the Jewish people are not God’s chosen people, he could be fired without
infringing on academic freedom commitments because that would be a the-
ological statement. But if Irving asserted that the Holocaust never hap-
pened, this would be a falsifiable claim for which he could make a
colorable claim as to academic freedom—although one might sustain dis-
missal on grounds that the view is not professionally competent, a view
AAUP officials have articulated, as we explain below. Now, if the claim is
so outlandish that it has no basis in fact, Yeshiva may follow Oberlin’s
example and dismiss the faculty member nonetheless.
Our point here is modest: this is one cost of academic freedom that is
overlooked. It seems wrong to penalize Yeshiva University for refusing to
keep a Holocaust denier in their midst. In Catholic terms, Irving’s view-
point would be causing scandal. In ecumenical terms, he disrespects Jewish
persons by denying something so central to their history and experience of
the world—especially when the Holocaust is confirmed by first-hand ac-
YASAAEgKsnfD_BwE. Separately, three Johns Hopkins faculty members published an op-ed
disavowing the professor’s essay. It said they “vigorously support the right to academic freedom
and scientific disagreement and debate. Indeed, debates are the very basis of the scientific method.
That same commitment to scientific debate means we must engage the dialogue in a circumstance
such as this, and not stand silently by.” Chris Beyrer, Robert W. Blum, & Tonia C. Poteat, Hop-
kins Faculty Disavow ‘troubling’ Report on Gender and Sexuality, THE BALT. SUN (Sept. 26,
2016), http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/opinion/oped/bs-ed-lgbtq-hopkins-20160928-story.
html.
One of us has stated elsewhere that whatever the limits of our scientific understanding of the
nature of cross-gender identification, members of the transgender community have an extremely
high risk of suicide and depression. That point should be the central consideration, sparking com-
passion and protections for a community at risk. Robin Fretwell Wilson, Being Transgender in the
Era of Trump: Compassion Should Pick Up Where Science Leaves Off, 8 UNIV. CAL. IRVINE L.
REV. 101 (2018); see Tari Hanneman, Johns Hopkins Community Calls for Disavowal of Mislead-
ing Anti-LGBTQ “Report,” HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN (Oct. 6, 2016), https://www.hrc.org/blog/
johns-hopkins-community-calls-for-disavowal-of-misleading-anti-lgbtq-report; Petition to Hop-
kins to Address False LGBT Reports, https://assets2.hrc.org/files/documents/Petition_to_Hopkins_
9.29.16.pdf?_ga=2.208595986.1200774244.1536682879-833632595.1530561798 (last visited
Oct. 6, 2018); McHugh Exposed, HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN, http://www.hrc.org/mchughexposed
?_ga=2.19752056.1584542250.1531411435-833632595.1530561798 (last visited Oct. 6, 2018).
226. Carole Cadwalladr, Antisemite, Holocaust Denier . . . Yet David Irving Claims Fresh
Support, THE GUARDIAN (Jan. 14, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2017/jan/15/
david-irving-youtube-inspiring-holocaust-deniers.
227. About, YESHIVA UNIVERSITY, https://www.yu.edu/index.php/about (last visited Oct. 20,
2018).
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counts of persons alive today.228 It is difficult to conclude Irving should
stay employed by a university when everything he espouses is anathema to
the institution, the community it has built, and its members.
This hypothetical is not far-fetched. In fact, both Lincoln University
and Northwestern University have Holocaust-deniers on their tenured
faculty.229 At Northwestern, Arthur Butz teaches engineering—a field
where research on the Holocaust is not central.230 But at Lincoln, Kaukab
Siddique teaches literature and mass communications, a field that might
broach the Holocaust as a relevant topic.231
Taking Siddique’s Holocaust denial up as a case study, former AAUP
President Cary Nelson232 acknowledges that Siddique is walking a fine line
between academic freedom and professional fitness by contending that the
Holocaust did not occur, a falsifiable contention.233 For Nelson, it is rele-
vant whether the faculty member’s contention occurs in a class where the
subject is germane, whether the speech institutionalizes ignorance and ha-
tred, whether the speech promotes “falsity as truth,” and if the speech de-
creases students’ respect for the faculty member, although “historical
accuracy is the determining issue.” 234 Detractors fear that Holocaust deni-
ers would not be marked clearly out of bounds under such a context-spe-
cific inquiry.235 Nelson recognizes the limitations of the principle of
academic freedom, noting it “does not protect [against] all of the actions
that can flow from Holocaust denial.”236 For Nelson, having Siddique tell
students, in a class on literary fiction, that the Holocaust never happened
crosses the line and amounts to hate speech, no matter Siddique’s intent in
making his point.237 For Nelson, the decisional tool for shedding faculty
members who betray the pursuit of truth to this degree should be the princi-
ple of professional competency, not academic freedom; a finding of incom-
228. James McAuley, An 89-Year-Old Holocaust Survivor Worries: What Happens When
We’re All Gone?, WASH. POST (Jan. 26, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/
an-89-year-old-holocaust-survivor-worries-what-happens-when-were-all-gone/2018/01/26/860462
dc-ff98-11e7-86b9-8908743c79dd_story.html?utm_term=.9ff6aa678e2c.
229. Cary Nelson, It Depends on the Context, in Does Academic Freedom Protect Holocaust
Deniers?, CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC. (Nov. 14, 2010), https://www.chronicle.com/article/Does-Ac
ademic-Freedom-Protect/125295. “[T]he way tenure has evolved, it is virtually impossible to get
rid of faculty members who have it, even if they are, amazingly, Holocaust deniers.” Id.
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. Presidents of the Association, AAUP, https://www.aaup.org/about/history/presidents-as-
sociation (last visited Oct. 20, 2018).
233. Nelson, supra note 229.
234. Id.
235. Some charge that the AAUP has rushed “to the defense of professors who don’t believe
six million Jews were murdered by the Nazis,” revealing a “bizarre [ ] understanding of academic
freedom.” Naomi Schaefer Riley, Apparently, If You’re in the Right Discipline, in Does Academic
Freedom Protect Holocaust Denier?, CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC. (Nov. 14, 2010), https://www.
chronicle.com/article/Does-Academic-Freedrom-Protect/125295.
236. Nelson, supra note 229.
237. Id.
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petence can resolve the matter. Thus, Siddique’s employer should ask
whether he has the “capacity to weigh evidence, to undertake rational analy-
sis, to perform academic responsibilities reliably,” and “recognize funda-
mental and well-established knowledge.”238
One can think of the line we draw here between theological claims and
non-theological ones as a kind of competency in the context of religious
universities that seek to perpetuate a specific view of their faith. Theologi-
cal commitments are core to the university’s enterprise, for which they can
demand competency by their faculty—defined as singing from the same
sheet of theological music. Most of the grounds religious institutions ad-
vance to justify religious discrimination in hiring cannot be fact-checked
and would act as theological commitments for which there would be no
academic freedom for faculty under this proposal: Is there a God? When
does life begin? Was Christ resurrected? Are we all people of the Book?
Respect for institutional religious freedom includes an understanding that
faith-based knowledge need not be grounded empirically.239
Like the AAUP, we believe it is essential to avoid unfair surprise to
faculty that theological commitments will remain the province of the relig-
ious university at which they teach. But unlike the AAUP, we believe there
is a considerably thicker role for notice to students who, without notice,
may make investments in an education that ill-serves their needs to be pre-
pared for careers in science, literature, engineering, or whatever discipline
they elect to study.
VII. NOTICE TO THE WORLD, NOT JUST FACULTY
Religious institutions must make explicit the limitations they place
upon academic scholarship, not only to faculty but to students. These
should outline the theological truths the university holds central and how
professors are expected to promote those truths. Schools should clearly an-
nounce the boundaries of the theological commitments in acceptable schol-
arship. And these limitations should be transparent—publicly available to
the general university or college community and prospective students, not
238. Id.; see also Cary Nelson, Cary Nelson Replies, in Does Academic Freedom Protect
Holocaust Deniers?, CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC. (Nov. 14, 2010), https://www.chronicle.com/arti
cle/Does-Academic-Freedom-Protect/125295 (“The issue in a hearing would be professional fit-
ness, which is a matter to be determined by a faculty review or hearing committee. That involves
academic judgments about professional competence and professional boundaries. The American
Association of University Professors distinguishes between speech that can be held to standards of
professional competence and speech that has no bearing on professional competence.”) (“. . . [I]t
is only [Siddique’s] professional fitness that is at issue in reviewing his academic status.”).
239. See McConnell, supra note 50, at 304 (“If religious ideas and approaches have anything
positive to contribute to the sum of human knowledge, we should recognize that secular methodol-
ogy cannot be universalized. To impose the secular norm of academic freedom on unwilling relig-
ious colleges and universities would increase the homogeneity—and decrease the vitality—of
American intellectual life.”).
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contained only in the employment agreement between the university and
faculty members. Doing so would give full force to the notice principle
motivating the 1940 Statement’s limitation.
But to realize the full benefits of this notice principle, one must go
further than the 1940 Statement’s focus on notice to faculty and look to the
public consumers of the universities: the students. Just as with faculty, the
question of whether students grasp the parameters of permissible academic
research at a given religious university is unclear. Statements of faith that
delineate these parameters for students, perhaps in admissions or online
materials,240 would aid interested students in their own decisions to attend
the university and fend off academic surprises at the student level, too.241
Although the AAUP’s first priority is to faculty members, as an advocacy
organization and as a union, increased notice to students would also ad-
vance AAUP’s more general mission of maintaining “quality in education
and academic freedom in this country’s colleges and universities.”242
Some may say that a student notice rule is duplicative of the “implied
consent” students give when they apply for admission to a school which is
so obviously connected to religious worship.243 For example, it is hard to
believe that students applying to Wheaton College make it through the ap-
plication process without realizing that the Wheaton experience will be sat-
urated with evangelical Christianity. Indeed, Wheaton’s homepage on its
website openly proclaims its Christian identity: Wheaton is a “top distinc-
tively Christian liberal arts college” and “top-tier education that will pre-
pare you to make an impact in the word for Christ and his Kingdom.”244
240. For example, Southeastern Baptist Theological Seminary requires its applicants to sign
“The Southeasten Covenant,” certifying the applicant “understand[s] and embrace[s] the commit-
ment of Southeastern to be a distinctively Christian institution, and I commit myself to seek to
know and obey Christ and His Word,” and that the student pledges to follow a Biblically-inspired
code of conduct. The Southeastern Covenant, SOUTHEASTERN BAPTIST THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY,
https://www.sebts.edu/files/Southeastern%20Covenant.pdf (last visited Oct. 20, 2018).
241. See Stephen L. Carter, The Constitutional and the Religious University, 47 DEPAUL L.
REV. 479, 484–85 (1998) (“[P]erhaps [religious schools] should, in effect, be required to give fair
notice of what religious rules they plan to enforce—but no school is likely to list everything, and
no student is likely to be aware in advance what issues might strike him or her as important after a
year or two of higher education.”). See also Berg, supra note 56, at 1343, 1369–71 (“The clients
and employees affected by [religious] organizations should have [ ] notice of the organization’s
religious identity.”).
242. About the AAUP, AAUP, https://www.aaup.org/about-aaup (last visited Oct. 6, 2018).
The AAUP has two sister organizations: (1) The AAUP Collective Bargaining Congress, which
“promotes organizing among tenure-line and contingent faculty, academic professionals, and
graduate employees and provide support to member chapters as they work to protect shared gov-
ernance and academic freedom, to uphold professional standards and values,” and (2) the AAUP
Foundation, which “funds, through its grant making process, the charitable and educational pur-
poses of the AAUP, including support for academic freedom and quality higher education.” Id.
243. See generally Michael A. Helfand, Implied-Consent Religious Institutionalism: Applica-
tions and Limits, in RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, LGBT RIGHTS, AND THE PROSPECTS FOR COMMON
GROUND (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Robin Fretwell Wilson eds., 2018).
244. WHEATON COLL., https://www.wheaton.edu/ (last visited Oct. 6, 2018).
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Turning to their student life page, the Wheaton experience is defined as
“faith, living, and learning [that] are intimately intertwined,” directly under-
neath a photo of students participating in a religious music performance,245
possibly in the chapel where students meet three times a week for worship
services.246 And even if this failed to alert a prospective student to Whea-
ton’s Christian environment, during the application process, the required
pastoral recommendation surely will: it calls for a Christian spiritual leader
to report on the student’s “personal commitment to Jesus Christ,” “spiritual
maturity,” “spiritual influence,” “spiritual qualities,” “church leadership
roles,” “dishonesty, abuse of alcohol or illegal drugs, or inappropriate in-
ternet usage,” and an overall “summary of the applicant’s spiritual life.”247
Of course, just because students understand the degree of faith infused
into a degree program does not mean they will apprehend the accompany-
ing limitations on academic freedom. For example, some students at Whea-
ton College stood with Larycia Hawkins, literally—standing up, wearing all
black, in a crowd as Hawkins climbed the stairs to deliver her final address
at Wheaton after she had agreed to part ways with the university.248 This
show of solidarity prompted many others in the audience to rise as well.249
Thus, staking out the parameters of academic freedom for students remains
prudent and can only decrease conflicts between the university and its
students.
With a high level of transparency, professors and students alike can
visualize a university’s religious bounds—what disciplines are most likely
to remain free, unfettered, topics for investigation, and which will be gov-
erned by a set of predefined truths. In other words, voluntarily assuming a
heightened obligation of notice to faculty and students ensures religious
universities will not in fact “fly under false colors.”
Alternatively, a religious school, like Loma Linda University, could
provide notice that it does not abide by the AAUP’s standards and rejects its
authority altogether.250 However, doing so assumes the religious institution
245. Life at Wheaton, WHEATON COLL., https://www.wheaton.edu/life-at-wheaton/ (last vis-
ited Oct. 20, 2018); see also supra notes 32–34.
246. Spiritual Life, WHEATON COLL., https://www.wheaton.edu/life-at-wheaton/spiritual-life/
(last visited Oct. 20, 2018).
247. Pastoral Recommendation, WHEATON COLL., https://www.wheaton.edu/media/migrated-
images-amp-files/media/files/admissionsaid/undergrad/app-forms/coll_pastor_rec.pdf (last visited
Oct. 20, 2018); How to Apply to the College of Arts and Sciences, WHEATON COLL., https://www
.wheaton.edu/admissions-and-aid/undergraduate-admissions/apply-to-wheaton/undergraduate-ad
missions-process/how-to-apply-to-the-college-of-arts-and-sciences/ (last visited Oct. 20, 2018).
248. Ruth Graham, The Professor Suspended for Saying Muslims and Christians Worship One
God, THE ATLANTIC (Dec. 17, 2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/12/chris
tian-college-suspendprofessor/421029/; Ruth Graham, The Professor Wore a Hijab in Solidarity—
Then Lost Her Job, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 13, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/16/magazine/
the-professor-wore-a-hijab-in-solidarity-then-lost-her-job.html.
249. Id.
250. See supra note 189.
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accepts being categorized as an “illegitimate educational institution” in the
eyes of the AAUP. It also assumes that the average professor applying for
employment or the average student applying for admission would be famil-
iar enough with the AAUP to realize the risk they take in becoming part of
a university that is not, at least partly, committed to academic freedom
around non-theological inquiry.
In the instance that a religious school opts to avail itself of the 1940
Statement’s limitation with appropriate notice to the world, the AAUP
should apply its normal investigation and adjudication of violations of aca-
demic freedom to non-theological disputes at religious colleges and
universities.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Religious colleges and universities straddle two spheres and perform
two functions: they perpetuate and preserve distinctly religious commit-
ments while educating students to assume lives in the world. They are not
only institutions of higher learning, but institutions of faith and culture, too.
And for many faiths, the very existence of the university is the result of a
faith conviction—helping students to prepare for professions while passing
on the unique elements of religious culture. These colleges and universities
are the locus for priming of a community’s particular worldview, making
their operation an existential concern for the faith tradition.251
Unlike a limitations approach, which allows universities to place them-
selves all-in or all-out as to academic freedom, this approach fosters more
respect for academic inquiry while leaving space for a vibrant pluralism that
accommodates religiously infused higher education alongside secular edu-
cation. Such diversity-promoting approaches are important to defuse the
cultural tensions that have pulled on the fabric of the nation, which is so
evident in higher education as a microcosm of American society.
Our goal is not to defend religiously affiliated universities as to all
clashes over what is taught. While it may be true that “our society’s com-
mitment to freedom of religion would demand some accommodation of the
need of religious colleges and universities to modify the secular principles
of academic freedom,”252 we believe that it is the commitments most core
to the covenantal university’s enterprise that certainly deserve protection—
the nature of God, our relations as persons to Him, the authoritative nature
of scripture, and so forth.
But as to scientifically falsifiable claims—whether the earth is flat—
universities either need to give faculty the room to dissent or give notice to
faculty and students that they are not real universities—in Finkin’s words,
251. Robin Fretwell Wilson, Introduction, in THE CONTESTED PLACE OF RELIGION IN FAMILY
LAW 10 (Robin Fretwell Wilson ed., 2018).
252. See McConnell, supra note 50, at 315–16.
\\jciprod01\productn\U\UST\15-2\UST207.txt unknown Seq: 46  3-APR-19 11:32
2019] ACADEMIC FREEDOM AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTIES 487
that they are “an unfree place . . . where no utterance contrary to some
officially established truth [on all questions] may be heard on the institu-
tion’s property.”253
253. Finkin, supra note 188 (emphasis added).
